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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from the February 23, 1995 final judgment
.'. .M| ... ,....]'. Lake City, Salt Lake

llif I In i d Curu.il i ,itin.

Department), Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding.
("R,

paue*

857-60)

(Record

There were motions for sumit^
' -, made by Plaintiff-

Respondent ("Sommer Eq. M ) and by Defendant-Appellant ("Trans
Tech"),
pari:

Trans Tech

denied, but Sommer FY] M «as granted in

December

by the trial court immediately prior to

the December 21, 1994 trial
during trial in

i <•»< i nihiln* !

*R.pp.844-9) Trans Tech's motion
*

• '..»." ti"inst;» cuivorsu summary

judgment adjudications, was denied.

Trans Tech's Notice of

Appeal was filed on March 15, 1995.

(R.pp.861-2)

Jurisdiction

s appeal is conferred by
Rules 3 and 4, U.R.A.P.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1

Whether the trial court prejudicially errec

violation of RiiJ e 56 , U.R.C.P., by" iiirikinci parUiil si

-. r

judgment adjudications an Sommer Eq.'s favor immediately prior to
trial # but before discovery (i.e. interrogatories answers under
oath by defendant Wayne Sommer.) had been r'nmpleted, "in*;! even
•though only a fragmentary evidentiary record was before it whi ch
nowise conclusively established that there were no "material"
issues of faLl in lit- ji's.ill veil an tnc U tail i"
QB3\M6381
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1

(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)
2.

Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in

granting Sommer Eq.'s summary judgment motion in part even though
its moving papers were in total non-compliance with Rule 4-501,
U.C.J.A.?
3.

(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)
Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in

refusing at trial to reconsider and vacate these partial summary
judgment adjudications when defendant Wayne Sommer was finally
ready to testify fully under oath and be subjected to crossexamination by Trans Tech's trial counsel, and was prepared to
orally testify to facts creating numerous "material" issues of
fact incompatible with the prior partial summary judgment
adjudications?
4.

(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)

Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in denying

Trans Tech's motion to amend its initial pleadings, which was
made well over a month prior to trial, and promptly after its
counsel had finally received the critical written interrogatory
answer under oath by Dale Mickelson1, and which asserted new
legal claims arising out of the very same March, 1991
transaction, which was based upon newly discovered evidence of
the false

notarization

by Sommer Eq.'s then office manager and

notary public, Wally (WW.M) Anderson?(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)

J

He is erroneously referred to in the trial transcript as
-Dale Nicholson"• See Tr. (Dale Mickelson) ("D."M") pp« i, 5-51,
211-223.
QB3\H6381.2
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5.

Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing

to try de novo at trial the critical issues whether the
triplicate Purchase Agreement form, which Wayne Sommer testified
at trial he had signed on March 1, 1991 in blank

and had never

been read by him, or explained him, was invalid, procedurally and
substantively "unconscionable" and/or equitably unenforceable?
(DE NOVa(STANDARD OF REVIEW)
6.

Whether Sommer Eq. is barred from enforcing any

seller's lien it might have obtained during the March, 1991 sale
of the Truck because of Utah's common law equitable principles
(e.g. estoppel, unclean hands)?
7.

(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)

Whether Trans Tech's mechanic's lien on the Truck had

priority over any seller's lien Sommer Eq. might have had?
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)
8.

Whether the undisputed false notarization by W.

Anderson that the illegible signature was that of the named buyer
and owner, "Jack W. Sommer", rendered Sommer Eq.'s purported
seller's lien rights "void" or "voidable"?
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)
A.

Whether a "falsely notarized" signature of the
stated buyer in the Utah Registration Certificate
and Dealer Registration Record renders the
recitation in the resulting Certificate of Title
of a seller's lien in favor of "Sommer's Auto
Wrecking" given by "Jack W. Sommer", void ab
initio

QB3\146381.2
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incapable of giving "constructive" notice of any
seller's lien on that Truck to an innocent
creditor such as Trans Tech?
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)
B.

Whether Sommer Eq.'s claimed seller's lien was
validly "perfected"

under the Utah Motor Vehicle

Code?
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)
C.

Whether the Purchase Agreement, signed

Illegibly

while the triplicate form was totally blank, by
Wayne Sommer (not Jack W. Sommer) on March 1,
1991, and subsequently erroneously filled in by
Dale Mickelson and Wally Anderson on March 13,
1991, as having the signature of the buyer-owner
"Jack W. Sommer", was invalid under the U.C.C.
and/or unenforceable because procedurally and
substantively "unconscionable"?
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)
D.

Whether there was, as a matter of law, no "fraud"
in that March, 1992 sale transaction?
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW)

9.

Whether the trial court prejudicially erred at trial

in refusing to allow full exploration of all the "material" and
"relevant" evidence pursuant to Trans Tech's requests for
declaratory judgment declarations in its initial (i.e. not
amended) pleadings?
QB3\1*5382.2
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STATEMENT OF CASE
A. NATURE OF CASE
This action was commenced during December, 1993 by PlaintiffRespondent Ted Sommer d/b/a Sommer's Auto Wrecking ("Sommer Eg.H)
against defendants Jack W. Sommer (father) and Wayne Sommer
(son)f and defendant-appellant Transmission Tech, Inc. ("Trans
Tech")•

(R.pp.1-5)

Sommer Eq.r s Amended Complaint sought (1)

recovery of the unpaid purchase price on a 1981 truck (the
••Truck") allegedly sold by it to Wayne Sommer in 1991, but which
was stated in the notarized sale documents to have been signed
by# and purchased by, his father "Jack W. Sommer", (2)
foreclosure of an alleged seller's lien on the Truck, and (2) an
adjudication that its alleged seller's lien was superior to the
mechanics lien of Trans Tech, which had made repairs on the Truck
pursuant to Wayne Sommer's requests during late 1993.

(R.pp.6-

17)
Trans Tech filed and served an Answer, Counterclaim and
Crossclaims seeking declarations

as to, inter

alia,

whether its

mechanics lien was superior to Sommer Eq.'s alleged seller's
lienr whether Sommer Eq. was legally entitled to recover any
money from Wayne Sommer, and whether Sommer Eq. had any valid
enforceable seller's lien rights on the Truck.

(R.pp.31-7)

Wayne Sommer and Jack Sommer, despite their patent conflict-ofinterest, initially filed and served a joint Answer drafted by an

QB3\146381.2

6/11/95-1

5

attorney representing both of them, which basically denied the
allegations in the Amended Complaint.

(R.pp.40-1)

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Sommer Eq., owned by Ted Sommerf the cousin of Jack W.
Sommerr moved for summary judgment during June, 1994.

(R.pp.133-

4) Both Sommer Eq. (during August, 1994) and Trans Tech (on
October 5r 1994) moved to compel discovery by Wayne Sommer, who
by then was representing himself pro se,

and who had repeatedly

refused to answer detailed written interrogatories served upon
him.

(R.pp.92-3, 287-8, 292-307, 332-40)

Trans Tech's notice to

submit its motion to compel for decision, was interposed on
October 20, 1994, and Wayne Sommer was ordered by the trial court
to answer them.

Nonetheless, Wayne Sommer never at any time

answered them.

Eventually Trans Tech, nonetheless, moved for

partial summary judgment adjudications on November 11, 1994
(R-pp.410-68) and also had previously moved on November 10, 1994
for an order authorizing it to file an Amended Counterclaim and
Cross-claim based upon newly discovered evidence.

(R.pp.382-7)

Trial did not start until December 21, 1994.
C, DISPOSITIONS AT TRIAL COURT
On December 12, 1994 there was oral argument on the aforesaid
motions and Wayne Sommer was present, without counsel,
representing himself.

(See I.Mem.Dec. (R.pp.748-52) p.l)

Although this was not an evidentiary hearing, with witnesses
being sworn in and subjected to cross-examination, the trial
QB3\W6381.2
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court nonetheless, immediately before trial, apparently made
findings

of fact

based upon what was orally said by counsel and

Wayne Sommer, but which was not in the formal evidentiary summary
judgment record (see R.pp.105-61, 165-257, 410-68, 524-81):
-There is no evidence of any fraud occurring in the
transaction, as the undisputed facts presented at oral
argument show the defendant, Wayne Sommer, to be the
purchaser-debtor of the vehicle, and the same person who
signed his name to the purchase documents.
(I.Mem.Dec. (R.pp.748-52), par.2, p.2)
!Ehis ruling was repeatedly adhered to during the trial, as the
'trial court continually refused to allow contradictory evidence
(e.g. via oral testimony of Wayne Sommer) to be sought or
submitted.

That pretrial decision did not, however, even address

the legal impact of the key facts that both of Wayne Sommer's
••signatures" were illegible

and one was stated by the "notary

public" to be that of "Jack W. Sommer" (not "Wayne Sommer"), who
had personally appeared before him and signed the triplicate form
applying for a Utah Certificate of Title to be issued in the name
of "Jack W. Sommer"—which it (P-3) was.
The trial court on December 16, 1994 granted Sommer Eq.'s
•motion for summary judgment in part and denied Trans Tech's
motions for partial summary judgment adjudications and to amend
its pleadings.

(See I.Mem.Dec. (R.pp.748-52), par.l, p.2)

During the trial on December 21, 1994 the trial court refused to
^reconsider" and vacate those adjudications, or to allow contradictory evidence to be submitted.

(Tr.pp.92-102, 231-3) At

various junctures during the trial, the trial court barred
QB3\«6381.2

6/11/95-1

7

questioning of witnesses concerning various "relevant- and
-material- matters, upon the ground that those factual matters
had been irrevocably settled, ala res

judicata,

partial summary judgment adjudications.

by the pretrial

(Tr.pp.33-4, 48-9, 90-2,

119-20, 123-4, 187, 209-10) The trial court also denied
defendant Wayne Sommer's motion to amend his initial counsel#s
pleadings to assert in the light of the evidence developed at
trial, the invalidity-unenforceability of the triplicate Purchase
Agreement form which he had signed on March 1, 1991 while it was
totally in blank, without reading the terms on the back sides,
and without even receiving a copy of what he had signed (either
before or after the blanks were filled in on March 13, 1991).
But the trial court also denied that motion.
5, 235-6)

(Tr.pp.133-4, 224-

Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment on

February 23, 1995.

(R.pp.857-60)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. ALLEGATIONS, UNDISPUTED "MATERIAL- FACTS AND GENUINE
POTENTIALLY "MATERIAL" ISSUES OF FACT IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RECORD AS OF DECEMBER 12, 1994
On July 7, 1981 a Utah Certificate of Title (P- ) for the
truck adverted to in Sommer Eq.'s Amended Complaint (R.pp.6-17)
("the Truck-) was issued in the name of SLC Corp.

(See R.pp.265-

83, Ex. 5)
On September 24, 1990 Salt Lake City Corporation signed a
document transferring, conveying and assigning all of its rights,
QB3\M6381.2
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title and interests as to the Truck to TNT Auction dba First Team
Auction.

(R.pp.265-83, Ex. C)

On September 25, 1994 TNT-First

Team Auction reassigned title to the Truck to Sommer Eg.

(Id.)

Sommer Eg. alleged in its December 23, 1993 Amended

Complaint, inter

aliaz

"On or about March, 1991 Plaintiff sold to Defendant Wayne
["the Truck0]:

Sommer the following Vehicle

1981 Ford, Model-MHVF80, Body Type-CC
8 Cylinder, Diesel, VIN-1FDXK84NXBVJ02644" (See Pl.Am.Compl.
(R.pp.6-17), par.4)
However, in point of fact, the Truck's Utah Certificate of Title
(P-3)# as well as the underlying Utah Dealer Registration Record
(D-2) and the Utah Registration Certificate (D-l), which were
purportedly signed under oath by "Jack W. Sommer19 (not Wayne
Sommer) and so notarized

by Sommer Bq.'s office manager at that

time, W. Anderson, all

stated that the purchaser and new owner of

the Truck was "Jack W. Sommer" (not Wayne Sommer).

(See

K.pp.410-68, 524-81; Pi. 2/16/94 P.D., Ex. E; Ex. 1; Answers of
Ted Sommer to Trans Tech's written interrogatories, ("T. Sommer
Answers"), numbers 11, 28; Answers of Dale Mickelson to Trans
Tech's written interrogatories ("D. Mickelson's Answers") numbers
5 # 6, 13, 17, 18, 23 and Exs. B and C; emphasis added).
The Amended Complaint also alleged:
•Defendant Wayne Sommer caused title to be issued in the name
of Jack W. Sommer, his father, with Seller as lien holder,

QB3VHW81.2
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copy of certificate of title attached-.

(See Pl.Am.Compl.

(K-pp.6-17), par.5)
However, the evidence in the record supported a reasonable
inference that this was "caused" by W. Anderson and Dale
Mickelson, at that time employed by and representing Sommer Eq.,
with Mr. Anderson being its office manager, while acting in
concert and collusion with Wayne Sommer, to "hide" the Truck from
Wayne Sommer's creditors.

(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; D.

Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29)
Discovery accomplished prior to the December 12, 1994 oral
argument of Sommer Eq. personnel (i.e. of the sole owner, Ted
Sommer, and its then current office manager, Dale Mickelson) also
reasonably proved via their respective under oath statements made
in response to Trans Tech's written interrogatories to them and
via the "material" written documentation appended to their
answers, (see R.pp.410-68, 524-81), that:
(1)

The statements in both the Utah Dealer Registration
Record (Ex. B (see also P-4, D-2)) and the Utah
Registration Certificate (Ex. C (see also P-4, D-6))
that the Truck has been sold to, and was owned by,
"Jack W. Sommer" [i.e. not Wayne Sommer], were false
and were known by Wayne Sommer, as well as the two
representatives-employees of Sommer Eq. involved in
this sale, W. Anderson and Dale Mickelson, to be false
at the time they were made under oath before the
notary public, W. Anderson.

QB3\M6381.2
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(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81;

D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5# 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28,
29; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added),
(2)

Dale Mickelson and the then office manager of Sommer
Eq., W. Anderson, caused the aforesaid sale
documentation to falsely state that the truck was sold
to "Jack W. Sommer", while acting in concert and
collusion with Wayne Sommer (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81;
D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28,
29, and Ex. A; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28;
emphasis added)

On March 13, 1991 Sommer Eq., utilizing the handwriting of
its aforesaid representatives to fill in the blanks on a
triplicate VEHICLE BUYER'S ORDER AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT
("Purchase Agreement") form (P-2, D-14), falsely stated, while
knowing that the statement was false, that the Truck was

ordered

and agreed to be purchased bys
••Jack W. Sommer
1861 Dehamn Ln.
Holiday, UT 8412M
(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6,
13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, Ex. A (see also Defendants' Exhibit
D-14 (MD-14M)); emphasis added)
!Phis Purchase Agreement stated that the salesman was MDr.", that
±he "Purchaser's Signature" was that of, and made by, "Jack W.
Sommer-f and that the agreement was "ACCEPTED BY" the "DEALER OR
SALES MANAGER", DALE MICKELSON.

(Id.; see also Pi. 2/16/94 P.D.,

Ex. D (i.e. D-14))

QB3\146381.2
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This Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14), drafted by Sommer Eq.'s
employees (e.g. via their handwriting), was intentionally false—
even according to Sommer Eq.—in that the purchaser was not
really "Jack W. Sommer", but rather Wayne Sommer and the
Illegible

signature in the "Purchasers' Signature" blank

purporting to be that of "Jack W. Sommer", was not his.

(See

R^pp.410-68, 524-81; D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17,
18, 23, 28, 29, and Ex. A; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28;
emphasis added)
Mr, Mickelson knew of the aforesaid intentionally false
representations in that Purchase Agreement when he intentionally
signed that Agreement as Sommer Eq.'s representative in that deal
involving the sale of the Truck.

(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; D.

Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29; T.
Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added)

Sommer Eq.'s two

representatives-employees, who negotiated and carried out that
deal on its behalf, were W. Anderson, then its office manager,
and Dale Mickelson, its present office manager.

(See R.pp.410-

68, 524-81; Ted Sommer's Answers, nos. 1, 5, 11, 17, 28)
The Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14) stated it had been signed
by the purchaser of the Truck, "Jack W. Sommer".
68, 524-81; Ex. A, D. Mickelson's Answers).

(See R.pp.410-

However, in point of

fact. Jack Sommer did not sign that document.

Nor did he ever

sign any document giving Sommer Eq. a seller's lien on the Truck.
(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; J. Sommer's Answers, nos. 1, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 22, 23) Nonetheless, the trial court found
QB3\M6381.2
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prior to trial that the "... undisputed facts presented

at oral

argument show the defendant, Wayne Sommer, to be the purchaserdebtor of the vehicle, and the same person who signed his name to
lie purchase documents."

(I Mem, Dec. (R.pp.748-52) par.2, p.2)

TEhe trial court simply ignored the key undisputed fact of the
*£alse notarization" on the Utah Dealer Registration Record and
the Registration Certificate that the illegible signature thereon
•was that of "Jack W. Sommer" {not

"Wayne Sommer" who had

personally signed in his presence.
The March 13, 1991 Utah Dealer Registration Record (D-2, Ex.
B ) # filled out and signed upon behalf of Sommer Eq., Dealer
Permit Number 2217, was intentionally and knowingly false given
the evidence in that summary judgment record, in that:
(1)

The only named owner, "Jack W. Sommer", did not sign
the par. 9 "affidavit" and the purported signature of
his therein, at best, is a forgery.

(See R.pp.410-68,

524-81; D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18,
23, 28, 29, and Ex. B; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11,
28; emphasis added);
(2)

The statement under oath in par. 9 of the affidavit
"...that all of the above information is correct and
complete..." was false in that Jack W. Sommer was not
the "Owner" of the truck.

(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81;

D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28,
29, T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added);

1JB3\146381.2
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(3)

The notarization of the purported signature of and by
Jack W. Sommer in the par, 9 affidavit was
fraudulently false in that Mr. Anderson knew that
whoever made that signature in his presence was not
Jack W. Sommer and that the purported signature was a
forgery.

(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; D. Mickelson's

Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, and Ex. B;
T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added); and
(4)

The statement in the blank in par. 6 that the
LIENHOLDER'S NAME was SOMMER'S AUTO WRECKING was

fraudulently false in that Mr. Anderson knew that the
stated owner, Jack W. Sommer, had not signed any
writing agreeing to the creation of such a lien on the
Truck.

(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; J. Sommer's Answers,

nos. 1, 6 through 13 (inclusive), 16, 17, 22, 23; D.
Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28,
29, and Ex. B; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28;
emphasis added)
The March 13, 1991 Utah Registration Certificate (D-l), also
containing an illegible notarized signature of "Jack W. Sommer,"
was intentionally false for the very same reasons. All of the
aforesaid key trial exhibits are reproduced in the Addendum to
this brief*

One look is worth a hundred words! Nonetheless, the

trial court found prior to trial that Wayne Sommer "... made no
material

misrepresentation

its detriment."
QB3\U6381,2
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reference to the lack

w

of reliance

to its detriment" merely

pinpoints the legal issue whether or not that fact is even
•material" to the legal issues whether the Certificate of Title
(P-3) obtained under the circumstances is "void or at least
•voidable".

B. FURTHER UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISHED BY TRIAL TESTIMONY
The negotiations between Wayne Sommer and Dale Mickelson had
started during February, 1991 (Tr. (D.M.) p.40)

The Truck was

taken by Wayne Sommer for its Utah safety inspection on the same
date that he signed the triplicate Vehicle Buyer's Order and
Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14) (the "Purchase Agreement11).
was March 1, 1991.

This

(See Utah Safety Inspection Certificate, D-6;

Tr. (W.S.) pp.108-16; Tr. (D.M.) pp.21-7, 41-7).

Wayne Sommer

left with the Truck on the date that he signed those documents.
(Tr. (D.M.) p.30)
It was Wayne Sommer who had signed the triplicate

Vehicle

Buyer's Order and Purchase Agreement form (P-2, D-14) (Tr. (D.M.)
pp.21-7) and at the same time had signed the triplicate
application form for the Utah Certificate of Title, which
included as two of the three parts thereof, the Utah Registration
Certificate (D-l) and the Utah Dealer Registration Record (D-2).
!Ehese signings were in Dale Mickelson's presence.

(Tr. (D.M.)

pp.27-30, 40-6) But W. Anderson did not sign and notarize that
latter

illegible

few days later.
QB3\Hfi381.2
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aware that the notary public customarily certifies that the
stated buyer was personally signing in front of him.
pp.62-4)

(Tr. (D.M.)

Yet this "notarizing" in this instance occurred 13 days

after Wayne Sommer had made the illegible signature which W.
Anderson notarized

as being that of "Jack W. Sommer."

Jack W. Sommer did not sign the Utah Registration Certificate
(D-l) and did not authorize his son, Wayne Sommer, to put the
Truck in the name of "Jack W. Sommer."

When he first learned

what had happened in early 1992, he promptly tried, but without
any success, to get Dale Mickelson and his cousinf Ted Sommer, to
take the Truck out of his name. Dale Mickelson told Jack W.
Sommer that it was Ted's deal.

(Tr. (J.W.S.) pp.149-58; (D.M.)

pp.35-9) W. Anderson, the notary public, died in 1992 (Tr.
(D.M.) pp.36-7)
The Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14) called for the Truck's
title to remain in Sommer Eq., but Dale Mickelson nonetheless
decided to have the Certificate of Title (P-3) issued "in the
name of Jack W. Sommer."

(Tr. (D.M.) pp.41-2)

Nonetheless he

never sent the Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) to Jack W. Sommer,
(Tr. (D.M.) pp.35-9) or to Wayne Sommer (Tr. (W.S.) pp.121-4).
Nor had Dale Mickelson talked to Jack W. Sommer back in March,
1991 about putting the Truck in his name.

(Tr. (D.M.) pp.49-51)

By 1992 the Truck was no longer running (Tr. (D.M.) p.39) as
the engine had burned out (Tr. (W.S.) pp.125-7).

Wayne Sommer

had never been given any of the three copies of the triplicate
Purchase Agreement form (P-2, D-14) (e.g. not back in March,
1JB3\146381.2
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1991), even though it was customary to do so.

One of those three

copies was totally illegible on the back side where the "boilerplate* provisions, including the seller's lien, are contained.
(Tr. (D.M.) pp.21-7; (W.S.) pp.121-4).

Ted Sommer had bought the

Truck for about $6,000 and it was sold in March, 1991 for $9,200.
(P-2, D-14; Tr. (T.S.) pp.68-71) Wayne Sommer never paid even
one cent towards reducing that March, 1991 debt, even though he
was supposedly obligated to pay $500 each month until it was paid
off.

(Tr. (D.M.) pp.20-1, 130-2)

C. DISPUTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
Wayne Sommer signed the triplicate Purchase Agreement form
(P-2, D-14) and the triplicate application form for the Utah
Certificate of Title on March 1, 1994—13 days before the
notarization of his latter illegible signature by Wally Andersons-while both forms were completely blank (i.e. nothing filled in).
The price filled in was way too high, as Dale Mickelson had
promised him that it would only be $1,000 over Sommer Eq.'s
actual cost (about $6,000).

(Tr. (W.S.) pp.108-16)

He never

even looked on the backs of any of the Purchase Agreement form's
three front sheets and he was never given a copy (e.g. P-2).
(Tr. (W.S.) pp.121-4)

The Truck was not supposed to have been

titled in his father's name.

QB3\W6381.2
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Certificate of Title (P-3) obtained from the state of
Utah as a result of that false notarization that MJack W. Sommer"
had in point of fact appeared before that notary public on
March 13, 1995 and had signed his own name on the triplicate
application form for the Utah Certificate of Title, rendered that
Certificate of Title issued by the state of Utah in reliance upon
-that -false notarization", "void" or at least "voidable".

In

either event, the Certificate of Title was not legally capable of
giving the fictional

"constructive notice" of the claimed seller

lien of Sommer Eq. which would otherwise be effected by that
Certificate of Title, since that seller's lien had been legally
*perfected".
The trial court ruled to the contrary that Sommer Eq. had a
prior

valid and enforceable lien, in reliance upon the erroneous

common law principle that "constructive notice" would nonetheless
legally flow from that Certificate of Title, unless and until the
innocent creditor, Trans Tech, had point of fact relied upon some
fraudulent misrepresentation(s) in the Certificate of Title.

The

trial court cited no legal authorities to support that necessary
major premise in its fallacious reasoning and it is not the law
in Utah or in this country as a whole.

This error is decisive

since Trans Tech did not learn of the purported seller's lien
until after

all of its work on the Truck had been completed.

Accordingly, it had priority unless the fictional "constructive
notice- doctrine gives Sommer Eq. legal priority.
QB3\146381.2
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The trial court's erroneous, but necessary, major premise is
not only incompatible with well-settled common law principles in
this countryf but the "public policies" embraced by the Utah
Legislature in enacting (1) statutory provisions governing the
applications for, and the issuances of, certificates of title for
motor vehicles which require "under oath" acknowledgements before
a "notary public" that the title owner of the motor vehicle
actually signed the application form (2) the Uniform Commercial
Code provisions governing the valdity of the Purchase Agreement
(P-2# D-14) which supposedly is the genesis of the seller's lien
of Sommer Eq. Wayne Sommer's trial

testimony that when he signed

illegibly the triplicate application form for the Utah
Certificate of Title and the triplicate Purchase Agreement form
on March lf 1991, they were both completely blank (i.e. nothing
filled in), and that he was not given copies thereof, renders
both documents legally invalid.
Prior to the trial on December 21, 1994, defendant Wayne
Sommer had steadfastly refused for months to give under oath via
detailed written interrogatory answers, his version as to what
occurred and why during the March, 1991 sale of the Truck.
Nonetheless, there were sufficient undisputed "material" facts in
the record

before the trial court at the time of the December 12,

1994 oral argument to mandate that it rule in Trans Tech's favor
as a matter of law via partial summary judgment adjudications if
Trans Tech's contentions as to what the controlling Utah common
law principles were, had been adopted.
C}B3\1A6381.2
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The trial court's summary

judgment rulings to the contrary are not only based upon
prejudicially erroneous legal principles, but also bottomed upon
genuinely disputed "material" fact issues.
The trial court resolved prior to trial the crucial mixed
legal-factual issue whether or not Sommer Eq. had under 38-2-3,
Utah Code, a valid enforceable seller's lien on the Truck, which
had priority over Trans Tech's mechanics lien for its 1993 repair
work on the Truck.

(See e.g. R.pp.6-17, Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint ("Pl.Ara.Compl."), pars.4, 5) But there were not
sufficient undisputed "material" facts in that summary judgment
record to justify the "yes" ruling of the trial court.

(see

I.Mem.Dec, R.pp.748-50)
Those undisputed facts which existed in that summary judgment
record as of December 12, 1994 were the result of the Answers to
Trans-Tech written interrogatories given under oath (to basically
the same sets of written interrogatories which also had been
directed to Wayne Sommer, but not answered by him) (1) by Ted
Sommer (the sole owner of Sommer Eq.), (2) by its then present
office manager, Dale Mickelson, and (3) by Jack W. Sommer.

(See

copies thereof attached to Trans Tech's motion (R.pp.410-68),
Exs. 1-3)

W. Anderson, the "notary public", was by then

deceased.

Those undisputed "material" facts established as a

jnatter of law that the aforesaid issue had to be answered "no" or
at least mandated a ruling that "material" issues of fact existed
-which had to be resolved at the trial.

UB3\U6381.2
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Sommer Eq.'s legal rights, if any, to be paid more money
a vis

vis

the March, 1991 sale of the Truck were only against its

claimed co-conspirator, Wayne Sommer, against whom it obtained
judgment after the trial.

(See R.pp.857-60)

The conspiracy

involved in the March, 1991 sale of the Truck, according to
Sommer Eq., was made up of Wayne Sommer, Dale Mickelson and W.
Anderson (at that time the office manager of Sommer Eq.).

There

were, during the course of this conspiracy, false statements
made, supposedly

under oath, which were "falsely notarized11 by

Sommer Eq.'s office manager, W. Anderson.

Cf, e.g., 15A C.J.S.

Conspiracy §§ 1-20.
Any seller's "lien" purportedly created during the course of
such a March, 1991 sale transaction, would be void or voidable
and legally unenforceable (e.g. because of equitable estoppel,
unclean hands) under Utah's common law equity principles, based
upon and reflecting, Utah's "public policy" emanating from
pertinent statutes passed by the Utah Legislature.

The false

1991 Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) stating that "Jack W.
Sommer" was the owner of the Truck being repaired by Trans Tech
during late 1993 and purporting to state that he had signed a
valid written agreement giving a seller's lien on the Truck to
Sommer Eq., was void ab initio

or at least "voidable" by innocent

creditors, not actually knowing of that seller's lien, such as
Trans Tech.

That Certificate of Title was legally incapable of

giving the fictional "constructive notice" of that seller's lien
to subsequent innocent lien creditors, such as Trans Tech, not
QB3\U6381.2
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having actual knowledge of the purported lien.

Cf., e.g.,

Lake

Philaas Service v. Vallev Bank, 845 P.2d 951, 953-4, 957 (Utah
App. 1993) (refused to enforce an invalid, inaccurate Utah
Certificate of Title misstating who the owner was).

(See post,

sec.V)
The Certificate of Title's (P-3) statements as to "lien" and
"owner- were rebuttable, not legally conclusive, and the
undisputed evidentiary record before the trial court—both in the
summary judgment setting and later at the trial—rebutted them as
a matter of law.

(See e.g. post, sec.IV) This Court should

adjudicate-declare, as a matter of law, that Trans Tech had a
legal right to foreclose its mechanic's lien and to sell the
Truck in a commercially reasonable manner in late 1993, because
its mechanics lien had priority over any legal rights Sommer Eq.
might have had vis

a vis

the Truck.

The basic purpose of those states, such as Utah, which have
enacted statutes governing the sales and transfers of legal
titles to motor vehicles (e.g. requiring state issued
certificates of title) involves "protecting the public from the
evils arising from the unregulated use, sale and transfer of
motor vehicles, from ...fraud

and impositionM, and they are

enacted by the state legislatures "...to lend stability and
certainty

in the business climate surrounding each transaction."

50 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §40(1) (emphasis added).
e.g.,

See

also

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §26

(w...legislative purpose to protect the public against fraud...")
QB3\14638I.2
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Statutes governing the issuance of certificates of title are
enacted "for the protection of" the public, including "those
holding liens thereon, against fraud"*
42(1).

60 C.J.S., supra.,

§

The false Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) stating that

-Jack W. Sommer" is the owner of the Truck, is incompatible with
that basic purpose.
Trans Tech is the holder of a mechanic's lien on the Truck as
a result of the work it performed thereon during late 1993.
Accordingly, it was among those creditors intended
protected

to be

by the Utah Code's requirements relating to the sale of

motor vehicles and in particular, the requirements concerning
notarizations.

60 C.J.S., supra.,

§42(1)(c) points outs

A certificate of title to a motor vehicle must be
valid in its inception.
While a certificate of title,
issued pursuant to statute and valid on its face, may
be voidable
because of fraud, a certificate issued on

false

representations

is void ab initio.
(emphasis added; p. 291)

!The -Jack W. Sommer" Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) for the
Truck was issued, according to Sommer Eq., because of and
pursuant to, "false representations" made under oath in the Utah
Dealer Registration Record (D-2) and the Utah Registration
Certificate (D-l).
B72 (Mo. App. 1990).

See also e.g., State v. Hudson, 793 S.W.2d
(See post, sec.V)

While the Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.W) governs the
sale of the Truck and the prerequisites for creation of a valid
seller's lien in the Truck (see post, sees.Ill, IV), "perfection"
of the claimed seller's lien on the Truck is governed by Utah's
QB3VU63B1.2
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motor vehicle registration statute.

Cf. e.g.,

National Exchange

Bank v. Mann, 260 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Wis. 1978); Milwaukee Mack
Sales v. First Wis. Nat, Bk., 287 N.W.2d 708, 711-2, 714-5 (Wis.
1980) (held seller never perfected its lien in truck as a result
of buyer's fraud); 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions §§150,
393, 440.

(See also post, sec.V) Accordingly, the provisions of

the Utah U.C.C. and the Utah Motor Vehicle Registration statute,
must be read and interpreted in pari

materia,

Cf.,

e.g.,

Sterling

Acceptance Co. v. Grimes. 168 A.2d 600, 602-3 (Pa. App. 1961)
(involved dealer fraud concerning certificate of title).
It was Sommer Eq.'s sequential office

managers,

W. Anderson

and Dale Mickelson, who made the false statements that the
purchaser-owner was "Jack W. Sommer" and that it was Jack W.
Sommer who had indeed signed as "Jack W. Sommer" via the
illegible signatures (e.g. in the notarized signature line).
That is the heart of the fraudulent misrepresentation which
voids,

or at least renders "voidable", the Utah Certificate of

title (P-3) issued by the State of Utah as a result of those
misrepresentations.

See e.g., The Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-

Door Corp., 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 35 (App. Sept. 7, 1994)
(stated "fraud" issues render the written agreement "voidable");
Baldwin v. Barton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1193-5 (Utah 1993) (discussed
-void" vs. "voidable" issue).

Ona Intern. (U.S.A.1 v. 11th Ave.

Corp,, 850 P.2d 447, 451-3 (Utah 1993) (held all the contract
documents in the fraudulent transaction were invalid and
"voidable").
QB3\U6381.2
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results ala the "clean hands" doctrine.

(See also post,

sec.I.D.)
DETAILED ARGUMENT
I- THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN GRANTING SOMMER EO.
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH ANY
OF THE KEY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OR ESTABLISHED THAT THERE
WERE NO "MATERIAL" ISSUES OF FACT REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED AT
THE TRIAL LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER
Introduction
Sommer Eq.'s June 29, 1994 motion for summary judgment
adjudications that it had a valid and enforceable lien on the
Truck and that this lien has priority over the mechanic's lien of
Trans Tech (R.pp.133-4), was governed by Rule 56, U.R.C.P.

(See

antef p«6) Under subsection (c) thereof, Sommer Eq. as moving
partyr had the burden of proving "••.that there is no genuine
issues as to any material fact" and that it is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law" as to each and every one of those
issues.

Sommer Eg. failed to sustain that demanding burden of

proof and accordingly, Trans Tech had no legal obligation to even
submit at that juncture any responsive affidavit(s) or any other
responsive evidence.

Subsection (e) of Rule 56 specifically

provides that it is only "(w)hen a motion for summary judgment is
anade and supported

as provided in this rule.,," that Trans Tech

had an obligation to submit affidavits or other evidence which
••••sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial-. Nonetheless, Trans Tech did have contradictory
"material" evidence in the record as of December 12, 1994.
QB3\146381.2
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However, Sommer Eq. did not submit any supporting
affidavit(s) (see R.pp.105-34), let alone one that would be in
compliance with subsection (e) of Rule 56 (i.e., "...shall be
made on personal
be admissible

knowledge,

shall set forth such facts as would

in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the

affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.").
Nor did Sommer Eq. submit any documentary exhibits in support of
its motion, let alone attach them to a proper affidavit
containing the requisite foundation testimony by someone with
personal knowledge (e.g. to authenticate the documents as genuine
and true).
Not only was Sommer Eq.'s motion for partial summary judgment
adjudications in patent non-compliance with Rule 56, but it also
vas in flagrant violation of Rule 4-501, C.J.A., which governs
such summary judgment motions.

(See ante, p.7)

Subsection

(l)(a) expressly requires that this motion be, inter

alia,

*...accompanied by...appropriate affidavits, and copies of
citations by page numbers, relevant portions of depositions,
exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the
motion."
the

Likewise, Sommer Eq.'s Memorandum did not comply with

requirement in subsection (2) (a) that

it "...shall begin

with a section that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which movement contends no genuine issue
exists...[which] shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the movement relies".
XJB3\U6381.2
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Trans Tech had no

real idea# as is guaranteed by Rule 4-501; as a result, as to
precisely what asserted facts and evidence it must contradict•

A. Summarv Statement of Disputed and Undisputed "Material" Facts
as of the December 12, 1994 Oral Argument
This detailed evidence has been previously presented (ante,
pp.10-7) and will not be duplicated,

Sommer Eg, claimed in its

Memorandum ("Mem.") (R.pp.105-32) that it was the "registered
motor vehicle lien holder."

(See Mem., p.l).

However, those

ultimate legal conclusions were based upon assertions in the
•Undisputed Facts" section of the Memorandum (see Mem. pp.1, 2,
7) which were not supported by any admissible evidence in the
summary judgment "record" before the trial court, let alone by
undisputed

facts. Conspicuous by their absence are any

affidavits under oath by Wayne Sommer or by Dale Mickelson.
However, it is worthwhile to re-emphasize that those
unresolved genuine fact issues were not necessary to be resolved
pursuant to Trans Tech's positions as to what common law legal
principles are controlling.
the

undisputed

(See post, sees.Ill, IV and V)

On

fact record as developed to that date,

December 12, 1994, the claimed seller's lien of Sommer Eq. was
-void" or "voidable", unenforceable and invalid.

Indeed, there

vas no evidence in that record even purporting to give Sommer Eq.
such a lien.

The backside of the Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14)

purporting to give such a seller's lien was not in the record at
•that juncture—only the front
Qfi3\146381.2
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B. Sommer Eo/s Motion For Partial Summary Judcrment was, at Best
from its Point of View, Premature Because Key "Material*
Evidentiary Facts had not been Proven by It to be Undisputed
The Utah Supreme Court cautioned in Frederick May & Company,
supra,

that when the "record" before the trial court vis

motion for summary judgment
would be produced
a wise policy

".••indicates that other

a vis a
evidence

if the issues of fact were tried...it would be

for the trial court to deny summary judgment where

such complicated legal questions are presented and determine the
issue of fact by trial."

(368 P.2d at 270; emphasis added).

As

of the December 12, 1994 oral argument, this was precisely the
situation.

Wayne Sommer had not yet answered under oath Trans

Tech's extensive and detailed written interrogatories as to what
happened during that March, 1991 sale of the Truck. The
prejudicial error of the trial court in nonetheless granting
Sommer Eq, the partial summary judgment adjudications, became
only to clear during the trial when Wayne Sommer's testimony
pinpointed the gaping chasms in the summary judgment record vis
vis

a

the "material" evidence.
Sommer Eq.'s motion should have been summarily denied and the

parties left free to proceed with further discovery, and to prove
at trial via "relevant" admissible evidence what really happened
and why during the March, 1991 "sale" of the Truck to "Jack W.
Sommer".

See,

e.g.,

Callioux v. Progressive Ins> Co>, 745 P. 2d

838 (Utah App. 1987) (generally summary judgment motions should
be denied when discovery is incomplete).

As of the December 12,

1994 oral argument the trial court's prior order to Wayne Sommer
tJB3\l«6381.2
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to answer Trans Tech's written interrogatories under oath, had
still not been complied with*
C.

Sommer Eg. did not Prove that Either Wavne Sommer or
Jack W. Sommer Actually gave it a Valid Written
Seller's Lien on the Truck Which was Then Enforceable

Sommer Eq. had to prove via undisputed ••material0 evidence in
the summary judgment HrecordM before the trial court on December
15f 1994 that there was a legal and factual "basis" (i.e.
statutory, contract or common law) for its alleged seller's lien
and its priority claim (e.g., a valid enforceable lien at the
time Trans Tech commenced its work on the Truck in late 1993).
Cf.9

e.g.,

Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678, 680-1 (trial

court's summary judgment adjudication reversed).

Sommer Eg. had

the burden of demonstrating that "...the winner is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law".
368 P-2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962).

Frederick May & Company v. Dunn,
"Such showing must preclude as a

matter of law, all reasonable possibility that the loser could
win if given a trial". Id.

See also

e.g.,

Foremaster, Movant's

Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 731/
734-7.

Cf.,

e.g.,

FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594

P.2d 1332f 1334-5 (Utah 1979) (trial court's granting of summary
judgment reversed).
The fragmentary "material" evidentiary "record" before the
trial court—provided solely by Trans Tech—demonstrated that
there were numerous genuine issues of "material" fact to be
resolved by the jury at trial under the erroneous legal
QB3\146381.2

6/11/95-2

29

principles embraced by the trial court. Accordingly, there was
no need for Trans Tech to have interposed any other contradictory
evidence (e.g. via affidavit).

Sommer Eq.'s summary judgment

motion should have been summarily denied because it failed to
satisfy its demanding burden of proof.

Cf.,

e.g.,

Mountain

States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles,
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geicrv
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988).
Indeed, summary judgments are wappropriatew as to fact-evidence
oriented issues (e.g. negligence) "only in the most clear-cut
case".

Bowen, 656 P.2d at 436. See also,

e.g.,

Thompson v. Ford

Motor Co.. 395 P.2d 62, 63-6 (Utah 1964) (two Justices concurring
in result).

Like principles govern false notarization-"fraud"

issues, such as the ones posed in the "material0 evidentiary
record in this case as of December 12, 1994.
For example, there must have been a valid (e.g. nonfraudulent) written sale contract signed by whoever the buyer
really was in March, 1991, which unambiguously gave Sommer Eq. a
seller's lien on the Truck, in order to satisfy Utah's statute of
fraud requirements. Cf.

e.g.

Rainford v. Rvttina, 451 P.2d 769,

770-1 (Utah 1969); Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780
P.2d 827, 830-4 (Utah App. 1989) (Judge Jackson dissented only as
to the holding, not the legal principle itself).
sees.Ill,IV)

(See also post,

Yet there was no such document in the evidentiary

record before the trial court on December 12, 1994. Since there
were genuine disputes as to one or more "reasonable inferences"
QB3\146381.2
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to be drawn from the -material" evidence in the record, the trial
court prejudicially erred by granting partial summary judgment
adjudications vis

a vis

those fact issues.

Id.,

780 P. 2d at

831-2 (reversing trial court's granting of summary judgment).
Cf.

also

e.g.

Freed Furnace Co. vs. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d

1039 (1975) (reversed trial court's summary judgment; held
genuine material fact issues as to holder of claimed mortgage,
including estoppel, existed); Beehive Brick Co.. supra,

780 P.2d

at 830-2.
The Utah Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning

perfection

of a lien (see post, sec.V) "...assumes the [present] existence
of a security interest [valid and enforceable under the U.C.C.]
when the application for a certificate of title was prepared and
filed."

Cf., e.g., Ozark Financial Services v. Turner, 735

S.W.2d 374, 378-9 (Mo. App. 1987).

The mere notation on the Utah

Certificate of Title (P-3) that there is a seller' lien does not
create the lien, it merely creates a rebuttable

presumption that

such a lien had been created by the requisite written contract.
Cf- Lake Philaas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951, 953-4, 957
(Utah App. 1993) (refused to enforce an invalid, inaccurate Utah
Certificate of Title stating who the owner was).

See also

e.g..

Picking v. State Finance Corp., 263 A.2d 572, 573 (Md. 1970) (no
written security interest signed by owner of auto); Auto Ace.
Corp. v. Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 139 A.2d 683, 685, 688-91
(Md* 1959) (fraud by dealer-seller); 7A Am. Jur. 2d, supra.

§26

("..•except evidence to establish fraud which would cause such
QB3\U6381.2
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certificate to be voidable...").

The evidence in the record as

of December 12, 1995 rebutted that presumption as a matter of
law.

Evidence extrinsic to the required written contract, the

Purchase Agreement (P-2,D-14), which raises false notarization"fraud issues relating to their creation, is sufficient to rebut
that presumption for summary judgment purposes.

Cf.

e.g.,

Rainford v. Rvttincr, 451 P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1969).
D.

Assuming, Arguendo, that a Valid Lien was Initially
Created by the Buyer when the Truck was Purchased by
Jack W. Sommer and/or Wavne Sommer, there were
"Material** fact Issues as to whether it would be at
that Juncture Equitably Unenforceable (e.g. Because of
the Knowing Participation of One or More of Sommer
Ea/s Representatives in the Fraudulent Creation of a
Falsely Notarized Certificate of Title Stating that
"Jack W. Sommer" is the Legal Owner of the Truck, when
this was not the Truths

It was undisputed as of the December 12, 1994 oral argument
that Sommer Eq.'s employees-representatives had deliberately
violated their duties in March, 1995 to comply with, and to also
require compliance of the real buyer of the Truck, with Utah's
statutory provisions governing the issuance of the Certificate of
Title (P-3) in the name of "Jack W. Sommer."

Accordingly, Sommer

Eg, should have suffered the legal consequences of their
deliberate derelictions.
S42(5).

Cf., e.g., 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles,

Sommer Eq. should be barred in equity from enforcing its

purported seller's lien against third persons, such as a
subsequent innocent creditors-encumbrances (e.g., Trans Tech).
Id.

at 301. There was no bona fide

QH3\H6381.2
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sale to "Jack W. Sommer" or

to his son, Wayne Sommer, and accordingly no bona fide

creation

of a seller's lien in that "false notarization" transaction.
Equity principles focusing upon the reality of the underlying
1991 "sale" transaction involving the Truck, prevail over falsefraudulent statements contained in the Certificate of Title (P3)i

which resulted from the falsely notarized underlying

triplicate application for Certificate of Title form*
Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1951).

Cf.,

e.g.,

The Utah

statutory registration requirements are for the protection of
innocent

persons giving value in good faith, not to deprive

innocent persons of their equities.

Id.

at 33-1. Accordingly,

it is mandatory that the statements made in the underlying
triplicate applications for Certificate of Title, be accurate and
truthful, and mirror the real underlying transaction.

Otherwise

equitable estoppel principles bar enforcement of the claimed lien
addressed in the Certificate of Title (P-3).

Cf. e.g.,

Wayne

finance Corp. v. Shivar, 174 S.E.2d 876, 878-80 (N.C. App. 1970).
Yet it was undisputed in the December 12, 1994 summary judgment
record that W. Anderson had falsely

notarized a signature as

being that of "Jack W. Sommer," which was not his.
Equity will not enforce contract documentation involved in
and arising out of a fraudulent "sale" of a motor vehicle.
e.g.,

See

Drettmann v. Marchand, 59 N.W.2d 56, 57-9 (Mich. 1953)

(fraudulent sale transaction involving auto in which maiden name
of one of participants was utilized, rather than her married
name; equitable lien fashioned in favor of innocent-defrauded
QB3\146381.2
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lender of money).
(Wis. 1914).
equity vis
value.

Cf. e.g., Laun v. Kipp, 145 N.W. 183r 190-3

A false certificate of title cannot prevail in

a vis

a person who has in good faith parted with

Estoppel is utilized to bar a person involved in the real

transaction from relying upon statements in the Certificate of
Title which are incompatible with the reality as to what really
occurred.

Cf. Carpenter v. Devitt, 122 P.2d 79 (Cal. App. 1942)

(son remained registered owner of auto which in realty was
purchased and paid for by father).

Consider in particular

Dissault v. Evans, 261 P.2d 822, 824-6 (Idaho 1954) and the
numerous cases cited therein.
A false certificate of title obtained during the course of a
•fraudulent- transaction will not be enforced vis
innocent bona fide party parting with value without
to what really happened.

Cf.,

e.g.,

a vis an
knowledge as

Automobile Finance Co. v.

Mundav, 30 N.E.2d 1002, 1006-7, 1011 (Ohio 1940) (false
certificate of title stating there was a lien on the auto was not
enforced because the lien (chattel mortgage) adverted to, was
held to be invalid; no "constructive notice" resulted therefrom).
Such a -certificate of title- was "improperly issued and is voidin the hands of one who knows of its falsity. JLd. at 1009.

Cf.,

e.g. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gall, 229 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio
App. 1967) (held owner of auto under false certificate of title
could not enforce the certificate against bona fide purchaser for
value).
Automobile Finance, supra,
QB3\H6381.2
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Besides, the certificate of title, being issued
upon the false representations
of Munday and/or
Northside Auto Sales, was void ab initio.
The very
purpose of the law is to protect ownership against

fraud.

Therefore, the certificate of title introduced in
evidence on behalf of appellant (plaintiff below) is

clearly invalid,
rely upon same.

and the appellant has no right

to

(30 N.E.2d at 1010; emphasis added)

This Certificate of Title (P-3) also was "invalid" and "void" as
of December 12, 1994. The Ohio Supreme Court in Automobile
Finance went on to also hold that the lienholder was estopped
from attempting to enforce its lien.

II.

30 N.E.2d at 1010.

UNDER UTAH LAW, TRANS TECH'S PROPOSED COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST
SOMMER'S AUTO WRECKING FOR THE DAMAGES IT HAD SUSTAINED AS
A RESULT OF THE MARCH, 1991 FRAUDULENT-"FALSE NOTARIZATION"
SALE TRANSACTION IS MANDATORY AND, ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO BE ASSERTED IN THIS
ACTION
The proposed Counterclaim is in the Addendum.

The

allegations are based upon 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notary Public, §25#
Wilful misconduct, which points out:
...there is no dissent from the proposition that a
notary who wilfully
and knowingly violates his
official duty, as by certifying to a false
acknowledgement, is liable
to one injured thereby, and
the party injured by such wilful act of the notary is
not bound to prove that he acted in reliance on the
false certificate in order to recover from the notary
or the surety." (emphasis added)
!Phis legal principle covers W. Anderson's March 13, 1991 "false
notarization" of the purported signature of "Jack W. Sommer" in
the triplicate application for the Certificate of Title, like a
IJB3\U6381.2
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glove. Accordingly, Trans Tech promptly moved to amend its
initial pleadings shortly after obtaining the needed evidence via
Dale Mickelson's written interrogatory answers, after it could
not wait any longer for Wayne Sommer to answer his written
interrogatories.
Rule 13(a), U.R.C.P., dealing with "compulsory
counterclaims", provides:
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if it arises
out of the
transaction
or occurrence that is the subject-matter of
the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its
adjudication the present of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction* But the pleader need
not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was
commenced the claim was the subject of another pending
action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his
claim by attachment or other process by which the court
did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating
any counterclaim under this Rule 13."
(emphasis added)
There can be no doubt but that Trans Tech's proposed amendments
(see copy thereof in Addendum) setting forth the additional
Counterclaim for damages (compensatory and punitive) does indeed
arise out of the very same March, 1991 transaction-occurrence
that is the subject matter of Sommer Eq.'s claims set forth in
his Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, unless asserted in this

action, this claim cannot ever be raised—period1
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III.

THERE IS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NO VALID SIGNED
AGREEMENT IN THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT GIVING
SOMMER'S AUTO WRECKING A SELLER'S LIEN ON THE TRUCK
AND ACCORDINGLY NO "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" THEREOF WAS
GIVEN TO TRANS TECH

The provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, as
supplemented by common law equitable principles, govern the
requirements for creating a valid legally enforceable seller's
lien on the Truck.

See e.g.,

Transactions supra,

§§1-2, 4, 6-9, 11, 14-6, 75, 92; 68 Am. Jur.

79 C.J.S. Supp., Secured

2d# Secured Transactions §150.

(See also ante, pp. 24-5) There

must be a valid signed written "agreement" expressly

giving

Sommer Eg. the claimed seller's lien in the Truck, which is
signed by the buyer-owner-debtor. Id.,
validity).

§§20,22 (fraud vitiates

There was no such "agreement" signed by the stated

buyer "Jack W. SommerH, or indeed, even by Wayne Sommer.
2,

(See P-

D-14)
There must be an accurate description of the parties

to the

transaction in order for the agreement giving the lien to be
valid.

79 C.J.S. Supp., supra.,

that March# 1991 transaction.

§39. This never happened in
The Purchase Agreement falsely

states that the buyer-owner-debtor was "Jack W. Sommer".
29 D-14)
seller's

It does not expressly purport to give
lien

(See P-

Sommer Eq. a

on the Truck, except via the words hidden

inconspicuously among the boiler-plate provisions on the back
side of the triplicate form pages. On March 1, 1991 the front
page of that form was signed illegibly

by Wayne Sommer in blank

(i.e, nothing filled in)—without reading it or having any of the
QB3\146381.2
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various terms on the back called to his attention or explained to
him.

He was never given a copy of that form he signed—either

before or after Dale Mickelson had filled in all the blanks.
Accordingly, that Purchase Agreement is "unconscionable,"
both "procedurally"
invalid.

and "substantively", and unenforceable-

See e.g. A & M Produce Co., v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.App.

3d 473, 186 Cal Rptr. 114 (Ca.. App. 1982) (terms inconspicuous
on back side of written contract form, unequal bargaining power,
terms not read or understood; held contract "procedurally" and
m

substantively" unconscionable).
Wayne Sommer's trial testimony put at issue the legal

validity of both the triplicate Purchase Agreement form and the
triplicate application for the Utah Certificate of Title form.
See e.g.

3A C.J.S. Alteration of Instruments, §§73-80. The name

of the buyer-owner of the Truck is, of course, a critical subject
which can result in these documents being legally invalid.
$§37-9,41,42.

Id.,

The filling in of the wrong price by Dale

Mickelson also rendered it invalid. Id., §46. The evidence as
to the filling in of the blanks in those two forms on March 13,
1991—almost two weeks after Wayne Sommer signed them—raises the
-material" fact issue whether or not the blanks had been filled
in in accordance with the orally agreed upon (i.e. within the
limited authority of the personfs] filling in those blanks), Id,
§§73,79. Moreover, Wayne Sommer's testimony that none of the
blanks in those two triplicate forms were filled in, in itself

TJB3\U6381.2
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pinpoints a fatal

defect rendering both of those documents

legally invalid, even though initially signed by him, Jd., §76,
Id., §79 points out:
•••For example, a party who writes his name upon a
blank piece of paper does not, except in a case where
the doctrine of estoppel applies, become bound on an
obligation thereafter written thereon, unless it can
be shown that he gave the person who wrote it proper
authority to do so, and as between the signer of an
instrument and the party to whom the instrument is
intrusted, the signer cannot be bound by the
unauthorized filling of blanks, or the excessive
exercise of authority in filling blanks intentionally
left to be filled. (p.340; emphasis added)
!Ehis result is in accord with the general contract principle that
there was never the requisite "agreement" between the parties,
even though the blank forms had been previously signed by Wayne
Sommer.

See e.g. 17 CJS Contracts §30,31,65.

Cf.

e.g.

Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc., 622 P.2d 784, 787
(Utah 1980) ("...parties had not given mutual assent to all the
essential terms...")
A valid enforceable seller's lien "attaches" to the Truck
only If and when a valid (e.g. non-fraudulent) written agreement,
expressly giving the seller that lien, is signed by the stated
buyer,

"Jack W. Sommer".

Jur. 2d, supra.

79 C.J.S. Supp. supra.,

§24; 68 Am.

§§358-9, 361. This is necessary in order to

satisfy Utah's statute of fraud requirement. Cf. e.g.

Rainford v.

ftvting., 451 P.2d 769, 770-1 (Utah 1969); Beehive Brick Co. v.
Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827, 830-4 (Utah App. 1989) (Judge
Jackson dissented only as to the holding, not the legal principle
itself)*
tJB3\146381.2
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•Jack W. Sommer") in the record before this Court (see P-2, D-14)
and this also is fatal to Sommer Eq.'s seller lien claim.
also

e.g.,

See

Picking v. State Finance Corp., 263 A.2d 572, 573

(Kd. 1970) (no written security interest signed by owner of
auto); Auto Ace. Corp. v. Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp.. 139 A.2d
583, 685, 688-91 (Md. 1959) (fraud by dealer-seller).

IV.

ALL THE SALES DOCUMENTATION CREATED IN THE MARCH, 1991
"FALSE NOTARIZATION"-FRAUDULENT SALES TRANSACTION INVOLVING
THE TRUCK WERE "VOID* AB INITIO OR AT LEAST "VOIDABLE"
This Court should adjudicate, as a matter of law, that all of

the documentation involved in that March, 1991 false
sale transaction, were "void" ab initio,
(See e.g. ante, pp.25-9)

notarization

not merely "voidable"•

The trial court cited no legal

authorities to support its decision to the contrary.
legal result is just, not only vis

a vis

Such a

innocent creditors such

as Trans Tech, but also with other respect to other innocent
parties, such as Jack W. Sommer.

It appeared unequivocally at

trial that Jack W. Sommer was not a party to that March, 1991
transaction and that he had tried in vain since early 1992 to get
Ted Sommer or Dale Mickelson to get his name off that Certificate
of Title (P-3).

Even complaining to the State of Utah in early

1994 could not yield results. Accordingly, it is up to the Utah
common law to afford such protection to the innocent.
The necessary major premise for the trial court's summary
judgment and trial rulings in favor of Sommer Eq., was the
erroneous
QB3\U6381.2
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non-fraudulent sale transaction.
American Corp.. supra.

Even if

See e.g. Meyer v. General

Jack W. Sommer would have

appeared before W. Anderson personally and would have personally
signed in his presence the March, 1991 sale documentation, the
transaction nonetheless should be held fraudulent and set aside
(i.e. declared "void") under the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act
vis

a vis

creditors of Wayne Sommer's (e.g. no "consideration"

therefor).

Cf. eg. Rosenheimer v. Krenn, 126 Wis. 617, 625-8,

105 N.W. 20 (1906).

Jack Sommer was not the real buyer and the

net result would have been to insulate the Truck from the
creditors of Wayne Sommer—the real buyer.
v. General American Corp., supra.

See also e.g. Meyer

However, it is not necessary

to resolve this issue in this appeal; after

Wayne Sommer's trial

testimony it was clear that it never happened that way back in
March, 1991.
!Ehe trial court's erroneous legal conclusions (R.pp.748-52/
844-9) completely miss the point vis
issues.

a vis

the decisive legal

Section 70A-1-103 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code

provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
of law and equity,
including
this Actf the principles
the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract/ principal and agent/ estoppel/ fraud,
misrepresentation/ duress9 coercion/ mistake/

bankruptcy/ or other validating or invalidating
shall

supplement

cause

its provisions. . (emphasis added)

Accordingly/ long well-settled common law "fraud" and "good
faith-bad faith" principles/ which are nowise

"displaced" by the

^particular provisions of" the Utah Uniform Commercial Code/"
Q23\14£381.2
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-invalidate* all of the March, 1991 sale documentation, including
the Purchase Agreement's recitation among the back side's
•boiler-plate" terms, of a seller's lien.
American Corp.,

See Mever v. General

supra.

Indeed, section 70A-1-203, U.U.C.C, expressly provides that
•(e)very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith" in its performance or enforcement.

"Good faith"

in turn is defined in section 70A-2-1Q3 as requiring not only
honesty

in fact,

but also the observance by Sommer Eq. of

•reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade".
See also,

Official Comment to § 70A-1-203.

Section 70A-1-201(19)

states "(g)ood faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned".

See also,

§ 70A-2-103(b).

Sommer Eq.'s

conduct during its handling of the March, 1991 sale transaction
to •'Jack W. Sommer" nowise
Wayne Sommer.

satisfies these standards—even as to

Accordingly, all the sale documentation is "void"

or at least "voidable" at the option of innocent third-parties
(e.g. creditors), such as Trans Tech.

See e.g. Mever v. General

American Corp., supra.
It has long beenf of course, well settled in Utah, as well as
in other states, that fraud (e.g. in such a sales transaction),
and in the creation of the documentation involved therein,
renders the documentation "void"—not merely "voidable".

See

e.g., Gerrv v. Northrup, 227 P.2d 857, 859 (Cal. App. 1951)
(-...the lien she would of obtained would be subject only to
prior valid
QB3\146381.2
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apparent encumbrances did not really exist, i.e., if they were
fraudulent and void or voidable,...").

There was at

least

"material" issues of fact to be resolved at the trial in the
light of all of the evidence, including full and unfettered
cross-examination of the two key witnesses still alive, Wayne
Sommer and Dale Mickelson.
Hence it will not make a major difference in this appeal
whether all the documentation involved in, and arising out of,
that March, 1991 "false notarization- sale transaction was "void"
ab initio

or merely "voidable".

Gerry, supra,

But the just rule was recited in

227 P.2d at 857, is that at least "(s)o far as

existing creditors are concerned...", "(i)n the case of a
fraudulent conveyance or mortgage, the law regards such on
instrument as being void...".

The March, 1991 "false

notarization" triplicate application for Certificate of Title
form (D-2) and the resultant 1991 Utah Certificate of Title (P-3)
certainly deserve that fate.

See also e.g., Lucas v. Coker, 113

P*2d 589, 550 (Okla. 1941) ("...conveyances in fraud of creditors
have, from the earliest times, been void at common law...");
Raapke v. Beacom, 144 N.W. 815, 816 (Neb. 1913) (held fraudulent
deed was ••void").

Cf.,

7 Am. Jur. 2d, supra,

e.g.,

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §42(5);

§ 39 (vendor fraudulently participating in

obtaining a false certificate of title is estopped).
no bona fide
fide

There was

sale to "Jack W. Sommer" and accordingly no bona

creation of a seller's lien in that March, 1991 transaction.
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The Utah Legislature wisely and justly requires that the real
"Jack W. Sommer- must have signed the Utah Dealer Registration
Record (D-2) under oath before a -notary public-.

But in this

instance the -notary public- was W. Anderson, Sommer Eq.'s office
manager. W. Anderson betrayed the trust placed in him by the
State of Utah when it appointed him -notary public- and violated
his statutory legal duties delineated in Utah's Notary Public
Reform Act.

See § 46-1-1 through 46-1-19, Utah Code.

V, THERE ALSO WAS NOT THE REQUISITE -PERFECTION- OF THE CLAIMED
SELLER'S LIEN AND ACCORDINGLY NO "CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE THEREOF WAS GIVEN TO TRANS TECH

In order for the security interest (i.e. seller's lien)
purportedly given by the backside of the Purchase Agreement to
have priority vis

a vis

the lien rights of innocent creditors,

such as Trans Tech, the -seller's lien" jnust have been
•perfected- so that it could give the fictional -constructive
notice* of that lien

to innocent creditors such as Trans Tech.

79 C.J.S. Supp, supra,. §25-29, 56, 58.

(post, sec.V)

But there

was no -perfection- of Sommer Eq.'s claimed seller's lien because
a valid

Utah Certificate of Title (see P-3), was never issued by

the State of Utah.

Id.,

§§32-3, 47.

(See also, ante, sec. IV)

The Utah Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning

perfection

of a lien merely "...assumes the [present] existence of a
security interest [valid and enforceable under the U.C.C.] when
the application for a certificate of title was prepared and
filed*•

Cf.,

QB3\146381.2
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e.g., Ozark Financial Services v. Turner, 735
44

S.W.2d 374, 378-9 (Mo. App. 1987).

The aforesaid Utah Uniform

Commercial Code rules are applicable to motor vehicles, except
insofar as these rules have been modified as to the "perfection"
of valid enforceable liens by special statutes (e.g. requiring
certificates of title to perfect) 79 C. J.S., supra., §§32-3, 47.
Accordingly, the mere notation concerning a lien on the
Certificate of Title (P-3)—even if
obtained and/or falsely

it had not been fraudulently

notarized—was not sufficient to

•perfect". The lack of the required valid Purchase Agreement
giving Sommer Eq. the seller's lien (see ante, sec.IV) means
legally that the claimed seller's "lien" was never "perfected".
The notation on the Utah Certificate of Title (P-3)
concerning a seller's lien does not create the lien; it merely
created a rebuttable

presumption that such a lien had actually

been created by the requisite signed valid Purchase Agreement.
Cf. Lake Philaas Service v. Valley Bank, supra

845 P.2d at 953-4,

957 (Utah App. 1993) (refused to enforce an invalid, inaccurate
Utah Certificate of Title stating who the owner was).
e.g.,

See

also

Picking v. State Finance Corp., 263 A.2d 572, 573 (Md.

1970) (no written security interest signed by owner of auto);
Auto Ace. Corp. v. Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 139 A-2d 683, 685,
688-91 (Md. 1959) (fraud by dealer-seller).

The evidence

rebutted this presumption as a matter of law.
The seller's lien must be "perfected" before there can be
•constructive notice" thereof given to innocent creditors such as
Trans Tech that do not really know thereof.
QB3\146381.Z
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79 C.J.S. Supp.,

supra,

§25-29, 56, 58. Motor vehicles are reguired to be

•registered in the name of the owner...".
§33.

If Am. Jur. 2d,

This reguirement exists to prevent the very type of

supra,
fraud

which led to the State of Utah issuing its 1991 Certificate of
Title (P-3) falsely stating that "Jack W. Sommer" was the owner
of the Truck.

The Utah Legislature reguired that the real "Jack

W. Sommer" must have personally signed the Utah Dealer Record (D2) under oath before a notary public.

But this never happened

and this was legally a fatal deficiency. See e.g. 1A C.J.S.f
Acknowledgments, §§1, 3-4, 7-8, 11, 13-5, 21, 49, 52, 70-2, 79,
85# 95-6. Accordingly, there was no "perfection" of Sommer Eg.'s
claimed seller's lien, as a valid Certificate of Title was never
issued by the State of Utah.

79 C.J.S. Supp., supra,

§§32-3, 47.

1A C.J.S., Acknowledgments, §11 points out:
"Upon the alteration after acknowledgment of an
instrument, to which acknowledgment is essential, a
new acknowledgment is necessary, and, where
acknowledgment is necessary to the validity of the

instrument, the filling

in of blanks,

the alteration,

or correction of the instrument will be of no force
and effect
without another acknowledgment."
(emphasis
added) See also Id., §49.
Wayne Somer's trial testimony that he signed the triplicate
application form in blank triggers this principle.
79 C.J.S. Supp., supra,

§60 points out:

-An unperfected
security interest is subordinated
to the
interests of a lien creditor
under the Uniform
Commercial Code provision conferring such status with
respect to a person who becomes a lien creditor without
knowledge of the security interest and prior to its
perfection, and under earlier similar statut(esn£hasis added)
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Since Trans Tech's owners-officers, Mr. and Mrs. Strebel, did not
know of the existence of Sommer Eq.'s claimed lien until

after

the 1993 repair work on the Truck had been completed, the claimed
seller's lien does not have priority.
W. Anderson falsely stated, as the "notary public," that it
was "Jack W. Sommer" who had personally appeared before him on
March 13, 1991 and who had personally signed the triplicate
application for a Utah Certificate of Title.

In doing so, he

betrayed the trust placed in him by the State of Utah in
appointing him "notary public" and violated his statutory legal
duties delineated in Utah's Notary Public Reform Act. See
S 46-1-1 through 46-1-19 Utah Code, particularly § 46-1-2,
46-1-10 ("...intent to deceive or defraud") 46-1-15 ("...notary
public is liable to any person

for all damages that person

proximately caused by the notary's misconduct in performing a
notarization")•
The Utah judiciary in fashioning its equitable common law
principles to govern the issues posed by Trans Tech in this
appeal, should effectuate the "public policies" embodied in, and
reflected by, the Utah Legislature's statutory enactments.
Utah's "public policy" concerning such notary public fraud is
strong and uncompromising.

Teeth are put into these statutory

requirements by not only providing for civil remedies, but also
by criminalizing the prohibited conduct.

The knowing possession

of the false Utah Record (D-2) is a class A misdemeanor under §
76-6-522, Utah Code; the knowing falsification of the Utah Record
QB3\1A6381.2
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(D-2) in the name of "Jack W. Sommer" is a class B misdemeanor
under § 77-6-504, Utah Code; defrauding of creditors (e.g. of
Wayne Sommer's) is interdicted by § 76-6-511f Utah Code.
W. Anderson's deliberate misuse of his notary public office
is a class B misdemeanor under S 76-8-201, Utah Code. Section
76-8-414# Utah Code, provides:
Every person who knowingly procures or offers any
false or forged instruments to be filed or registered
or recorded under any law of this state or of the
United States, is guilty of a felony of the third
degree.
(emphasis added)
In the same vein, the making of a "false" statement under oath
before a notary is a class B misdemeanor under § 76-8-503, Utah
Code, and where, as here, made in writing with a intent to cause
the issuance of a false Certificate of Title (P-l)f is a class B
misdemeanor under § 76-8-504, Utah Code.
The offending notary public is liable both civilly (i.e. for
all damages-losses caused thereby) and criminally for his
transgressions—acts of misconduct.

See e.g.,

Notaries Public, §§23-4, 25, 28, 30. Cf. also
("fraudulent acknowledgment") See also

e.g.,

58 Am. Jur. 2d,
e.g.,

Id..

§31

66 C.J.S. Notary

Public §§ 10(a) (liable for "wilful misconduct"), (c) (duties as
to ensuring re acknowledgments that person signing document
really is who he claims to be (i.e. "Jack W. Sommer")); 11(a)(e)
12; 13. See also 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notaries Public, §§25, (Wilful
misconduct (ante, p.44), §31 ("fraudulent acknowledgement"); 66
C.J.S. Notary Public §§ 10(a) (liable for "wilful misconduct"),
(c) (duties as to ensuring re acknowledgments that person signing
QB3\1«6381.2
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document really is who he claims to be); 11(a)(e) (civil
liability; notary -guilty" of misconduct in the performance of
his official duties may be held liable to persons damaged
thereby" for all damages-losses "caused" thereby), 12; 13.
Equity should refuse to enforce such fraudulent-"false
notarization" sales transactions vis

a vis

innocent creditors,

such as Trans Tech, with liens on the Truck,

Cf., also

e.g.,

37

Am* Jure 2d, Fraudulent Conveyance §§ 167-8, 172, 176; 37 C.J.S.,
Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 278, 312, 314, 319, 327. Nor would
there be any "perfection" of Sommer Eq.'s seller's lien.

See

e.g. Automobile Finance Co. v. Mundav, 30 N.E.2d 1002, 1006-7,
1009-11 (Ohio 1940) (held that a false certificate of title
stating there was a lien on the auto was not enforceable (e.g.
estopped; the lien (chattel mortgage) adverted to is invalid and
no "constructive notice" resulted therefrom; the "certificate of
title" was "improperly issued" and "void" ab initio)}

Hardware

Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gall, 229 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio App. 1967)
(held owner of auto under false certificate of title could not
enforce the certificate against bona fide purchaser for value).
1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments, §75 points out:
m

If a statute requires that an instrument must be
acknowledged before it may be recorded, and the
certificate of acknowledgment is materially defective,
so that it does not establish, actually or presumptively, that there was a valid acknowledgment, then
the actual recordation of the instrument will
not

impart constructive

notice

to third parties.

This

rule has been applied to a variety of defects."
See also Id., §80-5.
QB3\146381.2
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CONCLUSION
This Court should rule as a matter of law that (1) Trans
Tech's mechanic's lien had priority over any legal rights Sommer
Eg. might have had vis

a vis

the Truck, and (2) that Sommer Eq.

must pay to Trans Tech the amount of all the damages which it has
suffered as a result of not being able to go forward with its
1993 sale of the Truck.
be ordered vis

a vis

In the alternative, a new trial should

all the genuine "material" fact issues

relating to the Amended Counterclaim and Trans Tech's Answer
thereto.

In any event, this Court should order a trial upon the

allegations set forth in Trans Tech's proposed Amended
Counterclaim.

t

Respectfully submitted this // day of June, 1995.
Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.

Ross R. Kinney
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION
TED SOMMER dba SOMMER'S AUTO
WRECKING,
Plaintiff

CASE NUMBER 930014410
DATE 12/16/94
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER

VS
JACK W. SOMMER, WAYNE SOMMER,
and TRANSMISSION TECH, INC.,
Defendants

This matter came on for hearind on plaintiff's and
defendant Transmission Tech, Inc.'s motions on December 12,
1994, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding.

Plaintiff

-was present and represented by counsel, Gayle Dean Hunt and
Steven A. Wuthrich. Defendant Jack Sommer was not present or
represented by counsel; defendant Wayne Sommer was present
without counsel; defendant Transmission Tech was present
through counsel, Steven H. Lybbert.

The Court having heard

argument of counsel, having reviewed pleadings filed in this
matter, and being fully advised in the premises, now rules as
follows.

52

1.

The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment

against defendant Transmission Tech is granted; the defendant
Transmission Tech's

counter motion

for partial

summary

judgment against plaintiff is denied*
2.

Although plaintiff further argued that its summary

judgment motion should be applied to defendant Wayne Sommer#
the plaintiff's written motion and documents submitted with
that

did

not

seek

relief

as

against

that

defendant.

Accordingly, no ruling is made as to Wayne Sommor, and that
matter shall proceed to trial along with all other issues not
resolved by this ruling.
Pursuant to U.C.A. 41-la-601 through 604, plaintiff
perfected its security interest in the subject vehicle.
There

is

no

evidence

of

any

transaction, as the undisputed
argument

show

the defendant,

fraud

occurring

in

the

facts presented at oral
Wayne

Sommer,

to be

the

purchaser-debtor of the vehicle, and the same person who
signed his name to the purchase documents.

Although he

placed the vehicle in*his father's name, he made no material
misrepresentation on which Transmission Tech relied to its
detriment.

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

Ted Sorrier dba Sommer's Auto 3
i
Wrecking,
Plaintiff,

i

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 930014410CV

vs.
Jack W. Sommer, Wayne Sommer,
and Transmission Tech# Inc.,
Defendants.

t\

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

The above matter was tried before the Court on December 21,
1994•

Plaintiff was present and represented by Gayle Dean Hunt

and Steven A. Wuthrich.

Defendant Jack W. Sommer was present and

represented by Ralph J. Marsh; defendant Wayne Sommer was present
and represented himself; defendant Transmission Tech was present
through David Strebel and was represented by Steven H. Lybbert
and Ross R. Kinney.

The Court having heard testimony of

vitnesses and argument of parties and counsel, now finds and
rules as follows.
On March 13, 1991, plaintiff and defendant Wayne Sommer
entered into a contract whereby defendant was to purchase a 1981
Ford vehicle from plaintiff.

The total purchase price was $9761.

Mr, Sommer paid $1000 as a down payment, leaving a balance due of
$8761.

Pursuant to the contract, the plaintiff held title to the

vehicle until payment was completed in full. There were no
written terms regarding how the balance was to be paid.

Although

a reasonable assumption could be made that the balance was due

immediately, there was no evidence offered by plaintiff that any
demand was made for the balance at that time or subsequently.
Wayne Sommer admitted that he made no further payments on
the vehicle.

He further acknowledged that the balance of

payments are due# and that he believes he owes only $4500 to
$4700 for the following reason.

On various occasions in 1991,

Mr. Somer painted equipment for plaintiff, and he believed he
should receive credit against the debt for his work performed.
He admitted that he had been paid on a "per piece" basis for that
work, but that he had not been paid in full.

Plaintiff testified

that he had been fully compensated for the painting jobs. The
Court finds Mr. Sommer's testimony regarding credit against the
debt not to be reliable, because he failed to provide any
specific information to the Court regarding the work performed,
the time period, any balance owed him for the work, or any
agreement that he was to receive any credit.
Based upon that, the Court finds that the defendant Wayne
Sommer owes the plaintiff the sum of $8761, the balance owing
irader the contract.

Because no agreement was evidenced regarding

monthly or other payments and plaintiff made no demand for
payment, there is.no evidence that the debt was overdue until
this action was filed.

Therefore, prejudgment interest should be

calculated beginning with December 1993, when this action was
commenced•
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, plaintiff is entitled
to a reasonable attorneys fee against defendant.

Based upon the

evidence submitted, the Court finds a reasonable attorneys fee to

be the sum of $2882.50, plus costs of $179•00, for a total of
$3061.60.
As to defendant Jack Sommer, the Court finds no liability
for the debt owed to plaintiff.

There is no evidence that he

entered into any agreement with plaintiff to purchase or pay for
the vehicle.

Although Wayne Sommer placed his vehicle in Jack

Sommer's name, based upon their relationship as son and father,
that provides no liability on the underlying debt, which is
solely owed by Wayne Sommer.
As to Transmission Tech's claim against Wayne Sommer, the
Court finds as follows. On August 19, 1993, Transmission Tech
and Wayne Sommer had preliminary discussions about Mr. Sommer's
need for a new engine in the 1981 Ford.

Transmission Tech

verbally estimated the cost to be $5000; however, after the
vehicle was examined, Transmission Tech gave a second verbal
estimate of between $5000 and $6000.
On October 22, 1993, Transmission Tech performd the work of
putting a new engine in the truck for a cost of $6250.
Additional work was also performed to overhaul the engine and to
replace or repair other parts, all of which was authorized by Mr.
Sommer, with the exception of some minor charges. The total cost
of Transmission Tech's work was $10,432.48. Mr. Sommer
acknowledged that the work was authorized, that it was necessary,
and that the charges were legitimate.
has paid nothing on the debt.

He also admitted that he

Based upon the evidence received

in this matter, the Court finds the work was authorized by Mr.

Sommer and the amount charged was reasonable for the work
performed.
Based upon Mr. Sommer's failure to pay the repair bill,
Transmission Tech has retained the vehicle and seeks a judgment
for the repair bill, storage fees, and prejudgment interest.

The

Court finds that Wayne Sommer owes Transmission Tech the
principal amount of $10,432.48, plus prejudgment interest at ten
percent per annum pursuant to U.C.A. 15-1-1, and storage fees in
the sum of $2130.00 through the date of trial.
As to defendant Jack Sommer, the Court finds no liability
for the debt owed to Transmission Tech.

No evidence was

presented that he contracted for or even had knowledge of the
repair work performed.
As to Transmission Tech#s motion for rule 11 sanctions
against plaintiff, that motion was not argued.

The Court finds

no basis to award rule 11 sanctions based upon the evidence
received at trial, and therefore denies the same.
Pursuant to the ruling of this Court on December 16, 1994,
that plaintiff's lien is superior to that of Transmission Tech,
the plaintiff is entitled to have the possession of the 1981 Ford
for enforcement of its lien through commercially reasonable sale,
and Transmission Tech should be ordered to release the vehicle to
plaintiff.

Transmission Tech's motion for authority to remove

the engine or other parts presently on or in the vehicle is
denied.
Based upon the above, the Court awards a judgment to
plaintiff against defendant Wayne Sommer in the sum of $8761
57

pursuant to the contract, plus attorneys fees and costs in the
sum of $3061.60. Defendant and cross-claim plaintiff
Transmission Tech is awarded a judgment against defendant Wayne
Sommer in the sum of $10,432.48 for repair work on the vehicle,
plus prejudgment interest pursuant to U.C.A. 15-1-1 and storage
fees in the sum of $2130.00 through the date of trial.
Transmission Tech is ordered to release the vehicle to plaintiff
for sale.
Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare findings,
conclusions, and order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this o\

day of February, 1995.
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1. CAR

TRUCK: :.

TRAILER

MOTORCYCLE.^

K f M M W l f (ilt hlT.

2. OWNER INFORMATION

.mi r r ADuitt:SS_L^J_l,I.L'lIL!LJ.-iL
•ly.JLUA.X

FEB/

MAR/.

APR/

MAY*

JUN/_

JUL/

AUG<

SEP/.

OCT'

NitV

0£C/_

JAN'

.IM i. u suiitii.r.
\
fiiAir_UI 7iP.^'«ii?J.axiNrY_H.l..

3. VEHICLE INFORMATION
NUMBCR

I 1 UXKtt«iHXHVJU/iHi/i
MHVI-VII^

• •<•••• i n

• .IHM1 l i t '

• aM*;*: vvrK%4 ir u>* tn«t.r. •«vi«_A. / l54P.M
«i*•< K r i-jv.*;
oiFsr i
X MK«fAi r

I . . . . * V *?.Vfi!!
I
4l.Ui-i«4 I.*******. mm-mitM

f

t '
* ~'
a * 01 Sime Tit*
H I Ji:.w..mf I.iv ilii.l
.. .Cutui Onfci <* Mcdi L««II

niCvKHJ-; VIN

..

PREVIOUS WEIGHT.

CURRENT TRANS ACT ION INFORMATION
T t f h s Type
A,Pl.Uc»Ml-

Plate Type

Special

__P<HS0lUllt«.Hl

F<**Qn Vet veto
_ N a m e Change Ort.
_ Survivor stop
UftOunvt
Com Passenger
Repossess***
Partial Yr I
Rcourfl

I>SAI**J
.»

a«ho

5. TOR LEASED VEHICLES ONLY
yH\OunRey

I l l SSII'SMAMI'

^
«\ » "»£jt*-*

J» 1! Y

^ SIAIC

L _ 7*

*

'• » *

LUMM-**

|t irv^*

L

SOtMniif

COUNl Y

W .DUO

r,u

r

J L SIAIC

U T

/ ^

MKU'.r

VALUE

»K

TrJillLULujUiil v- J?JLl

_

AM1MIIMM4 H

Sales Ta*
NOTF
TAX AREA

VIN vEniricATiori (ALL OUT OF STATE VEHICLES)

7. FOR FLEET VEHICLES ONLY
A<:<:< M I N I NUi.ilIFII

Fi»mnt

_A|*joiUomaJ
750 trailer

PROPERTY TAX CLEARANCE

APTO t.T.EiT.Ti.i;

'•'•?

NatlGuatd

Oup Tme

1^ - W t Incc

16. FOR VEHliTLESFINANCEDBY LOAN
Uini/imwyr

I imvc i*. i r * . . * ^ Hf^tfx'i'Hi ti«' vHncie UuscmxHl m section J .n«s IM«I llvj
li*uii|4i'«i !••(••• i:<«i<t,i ;if SI own
FLCXI* NUMRI n

INIItA".fAIC

F XI MP I
!JGIHI»|H Al M 4 I H 4 . I I )

0. PURCHASE AFFIDAVIT

C N f O ^ . f Ml N l A<XNCY

OAlC

SALES TAX CALCULATION
Loan O x i i ^ _ ._Ciiw • * S.ne^

IUIAL PUIICNASE PRICE
$.
LIT»!i ALLOWANCE FOR TRADE-IN VFl IK.LC * .
NT t PURCHASE PRICE
Sm
tNAUf *IN yi

?y+b7V

i.'
OLD?
MSO
_AIUJ3vit
-_Mcrotisch

_ _ _ _ _ _ « _ .

HtCvKXlSPLAIC* .

I t . M*»;«»* «;M:IIHJS ntOClul.-C.il INIMIS
^ . _,...
. _ _
Nm At:lu.-rJM**:kP'
j

MHHV^

A ~*J '

PLATE TRANSFER INFORMATION
« MI ITM_ _.

UCCKUC
At lull MA*.**.*

I

PREVIOUS REC. INFO.
UTAH PLATE # / g K ^ r ^ t y ^ '
EXPIRATION nATC

uiAiiliuriin
>\jt.iii T.tm
M M , i - t l.ii - i f
.^i4ii*i«..ii«'.if ' . *

1 . OUOMETER DISCLOSURE SIA1EMENT
Putci cxloniolor reacting exactly as shown in seller's iliv
< kisuie on cuirent title.
I

9 6 2 4 CN

EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP ^ ^y» 3 < £ V ) /

M W I

V , H I M A K C _.>'."•«'•

I 4 M J I llllllCAISNG
"

NEW PLATE NUMBER

WHEN SOLD.

VIN / SERIAL

.IMI

OFF-HIGHWAY..

EXPIRATION MONTH/YEAR

• iVVNl l< NAi.U I.UI

•m

SNOWMOBILE

SHADED AREA FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

fair Moikei Vame

LOSS Ti.l(K-itir.M l.l'ii>r»| VMuC

Not Fat kLwk.t V.A*..
SMet Ta« One
Less Soles T.i* Patl To Ai oilier Slate

Hi^ikn

IRAOr-INVINOR
S^.IUALNO
IF F. KEMPT. SIAIE REASON .

Net Sales Ta« Quo tor Resale Tai # .

9. AFFIDAVIT OF OWNER(S)
t'Vvtf tlw m«k.t««ji«0 .Mk»ki m«JH a-MH Mt.il. «UUM.1 lo Mw hiii «r«ol«d «iftfcion6
.rfo** l am/Wn aw wv* owneiii) of M « vatvci* cMnlted. MVM aM MMMM nMoiinauun «

U C E N S E D DEALER REPORT OF SALE
sui:;u;i'.:: A U T O WRI:CKINC

SAFETY NSP6C1I0N I v u S a B E f t ^ l L i l i z i i !

NEW

• .4i%»\.w«)«-l*t^k<V'..ii«iiii.aiiw^«iAwV*r..ii»t*<«\»>«r4««Miitt.»»ri»««*Mi r*i *•*»

.1

tT>rflw Hnn+S

USEOJL

DEALER NUMBER

^217

EACIflNfMELVOWNER MUST SIGN BELOW
(TATE s m n U J / 1 J / 9 TEMPORARY PERMIT NUMBER . J $529*1,
I. IhL* aoove IUHCU dr.*a«ei certify ««(tlas wticie rv.s been ciekveieo to the
purchaser named iw»\. Itvii the Mitornuion MI this refiort is tiua ai«J correct
#na Conines WI»I UC4I«J«?. MKl that, MI urn rcpo*?mg ol sates and use Ua
as loa^tMi bv UC S9-1?> tOrtOI
SUBSCRIBED ANO'SWORN BEFORE ME Tl^S[ j DAY OF.
v
NOIARY PUBLIC OR MV. EXAMINER

COrJlUssioNE^pW!

|[1f

I am curreiK. or

<X/' i^fA>.

^

I am not current

^y//^V

(siyitatute ol Oealer or authorized represeitiati
eseiu

EXAMINING OFFICER NUMBER.

rtt$

COHM tc-sssetcv ices

&?

EXHIBIT B

UTAH REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE
UTAH STATE U X COMMISSION. MOTOR VEHICLE C ^ S O N 1095 MOTOR ^ N U E SAULAKE CIT

% CAr\_

jTRUCKJ^

TRfllEB

,

MOTORCYCLE

2. OWNER INFORMATION ' . i ^ ^ ^ W N l ^ R ? Y P £ r
m

OWNER NAMElS)

J~ y _

n**
jjTIREET ADDRESS.
CITY

I

(^EXPIRATION MONTH/YEAR

"

HtfawsStiafciv,
.^^CTJTT

-**-19A4

SNOWMOBILE

SHADED AREA FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

>'Y a p _ g * U : r » CQUNTy ? l

FEB/

A P R / . J.

MAY/

JUN/_

—

AUG/

SEP/.

_

NOV/

DEC/.

OCU

n

PREVIOUS REG. INFO.

UTAH P L A T E # ^ * f ± ± ^ f 2 £ l 4 i ' ' «

3. VEHICLE INFORMATION

EXPIRATION D A T E _ i L ^ .

WHEN SOLD-

il&J

.M&OEL

g - ^ J i f c ^ ^ -**

«f^
flijbsS

WEIGHT i i p t a i ^ ' y

CftECKF:GAS_

4

^ ^ "

EVIDENCE O F OWNERSHIP 0 . f / , ?.s;s./
[UTAH TTTLE N O
c / • -" -. ^
JScttahTair*-

j

4 . ODOMETER DISCLOSURE STATEMENT *

CURRENT TRANSACTION INFORMATION

rniign VWaOe

« _ _ Personalized

. . . N a m e Change Only
.Radio

...Survivorship

. N a t l Guard

. . C o m . Passenger

—..Lien Change

Plate RepL
^Oup.Reg.

.Exempt

DujxTide
ADDRESS.
.COUNTY.^

:y.- '

Special

Plate Type

T r i h s Type

. Mileage exceeds m e c h a n ^ frnfo _ ! . Plate/title
. . P l a t e Transfer
. Not Actual Mileage

.ZIP.

_Moof«ch

PREVIOUS WEIGHT.

^Renewal

.STATE.

^

Affidavit

Court Order or Mech. ban

PREVIOUS PLATE#:

5 . / F O R LEASED VEHICLES ONLY

CTTY.

^.MSO.

PLATE T R A N S F E R I N F O R M A T I O N
PREVIOUS VIN:

OTHER

'Enter odometer reading exactly a s shown i n seller's disc l o s u r e o n current title..
*>CCKONE: :
•OOOMETERREAONG /

(Miles or Kjtometers.no tenths)

. m r w^ •

Out Of State Title

—CertrfcajeoTSate* '

D E S E L ^ J ; " PROPANE '

.

Utah Due, Tide App. * " . . U t a h Salvage Title (SC)

•CYUNQERS

•>••.-•,

NEW PLATE NUMBER

9 6 2 4 CHI

JAN/. —

.Wtlncr.

.Apportioned

Partial Yr.(

.Sales Tax

. 7 5 0 Trailer

Rebuilt

)

NOTE:.
PROPERTY TAX CLEARANCE

6. FOR VEHICLES FINANCED BY LOAN

TA*AW£A

U£NIK>LDERSNAMP j , ' , ' ' ' ' ^ ' ^ ' ,

(m Vt* '

^'''IMMI*''

umtg_^

•«I

QTV

•

*•*C * ^

STATE *''*'

2P::,:"'-<'

ACwM- »f NUMBER
O f c > . . * APPORTIONED

FLEET N U M B £ R _

frTTRASTATE

*4\V

COUNTy S *

7. FOR FLEET VEHICLES ONLY

~"

VIN VERIFICATION (ALL OUT OF STATE VEHICLES)
I have personally inspected the vehicle desaioea m secten 3 and fmd the
description to be correct as shown.

EXEM^r "
SIGNED (PEACE OFFICER)

16.

SALES TAX CALCULATION
Local Code
Bill Of S a i e ^ _ F a « r Market Value
Less Trade-in Fair Market Value
Net Fair Market Value
Sales Tax Due
Less Sales Tax Paid To Another State

I *» J»i i ' • <RCHASE PRICE
$_
j LEii • * J.GWANOE FOR TRADE-IN VEHICLE $ «
KETH-.-^HASE PRICE
$ .
TRADC-H y
i**"»
TRADE-Hi VIN OR
SERIAL NO.
r EXEMPT. STATE REASON•«
9.

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

DAT!;

f-^.CHASE AFFIDAVIT

AFFIDAVIT O F OWNER(S)

Net Sales Tax Due (or Resale Tax # _

-)

UCENSEO DEALER REPORT OF SALE

^S^^^^^^^^*-^-^

f ^ ' a ^ o o m p M e . aid »»ul

$
$
S
S
S

H£M__

uynx,

'KAIERNUMBER.

^ SODOJillli^O*"^

^££5d£»™~-

iSSS^sSssSi&M8
I « < M M A M with w * 1 * * « • * * *

"NOTARY PUBLIC OR M.V. tXAMP^R

«~~ TSftSSfe^^S.

"OWNCRISI SIGNATURE (&"* * " ~ •—' - * » * "*>

V j ^ T E O BY UTAH MOTOR \

fOHMVC^MCHEV 10/10

63

IMPORTANT INFORMATION
REGISTRATION NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED BY THE REGISTERED OWNER(S) AND APPROVED BY THE
MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION.
YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LICENSE PLATES ISSUED TO YOU FOR THIS VEHICLE. IF VEHICLE
IS SOLD OR DISPOSED OF, REMOVE YOUR UCENSE PLATES. PLATES MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO
ANOTHER VEHICLE IF REGISTERED IN THE SAME NAME(S). OTHERWISE PLATES MUST BE SURRENDERED TO THE DIVISION WITHIN 20 DAYS. REGISTRATION CARD ALONG WITH A NEGOTIABLE TITLE
MUST BE SURRENDERED TO THE PURCHASER OF THE VEHICLE.
WITHIN 10 DAYS AFTER .ADDRESS CHANGE, SEND WRITTEN NOTIFICATION TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE
DIVISION. 1095 MOTOR AvCNUE. SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84116.

FEES
PASSENGER PLATE * TITLE
TRUCK PLATE & TITLE <a 6.000
TRUCK PLATE & TITLE <w 9.000
TRUCK PLA1E & TlTLE @> 12.000
TRAILER PLATE & TITLE
MOTORCYCLE PLATE & TITLE

$ 18.00
$20.50
$2tt.00
$43.00
$ 14.50
$ 14.00

* PLUS SALES TAX IF DUE *

THE FEES USTED ARE THE MOST FREQUENTLY USED FEES. IF VEHICLE FALLS INTO A CATEGORY
OTHER THAN THOSE ABCVF EXAMINING OFFICER WILL COMPUTE FEES. OR YOU MAY CALL
f^JH-ttiOt). (WITKDAY:*. ^ AM 1<»:. i i«"..
* • ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR TITLE AND REGISTRATION ARE:

NEGOTIABLE TITLE / NOTARIZED ir REQUIRED
.SAFETY INSPECTION CERTIFICATE 0ATFD NO MORE THAN CO DAYS PRIOR TO APPLICATION.
.EMISSION INSPECTION FOR RESIDENTS OF SALT LAKE. DAVIS AND UTAH COUNTY.
GURHt-NT O U O M E T E R READlNC: ENTER ODOMETER READING AND CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX
EXACTLY AS SHOWN ON TITLE BEING SURRENDERED.
.PROPERT" ~.V< CLEARANCE IP OI.IF
POLICE OFFICER INSPECTION OF VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER REQUIRED ON OUT OF STATE
VEHICLES.
INFORMATION MtJf.T BF COMPIETf AND IFGIRIX
RFG'STRATION CERTIFlCATL MUST BE CARRIED IN VEHICLE AT ALL TIMES

64

VtMiULt bUYfcH 5 ORDER AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT

StLLtK:

±s

3

IA

Mfi-^L A

(btjff'K

7
6^j=^tJ^y.

"^ounty

Suit

Res Phone

Z*>Code

Bus Phone

t W e hereby order frorrvyou and agree to purchase from you subject to all terms, conditions and agreements contained herein, and the conditions printed on
reverse side hereof the\llowing vehicle.
^
^^^
w J
m^

SERIES-

ED DDEMO
DNEW EtJSEC

_ ^

SALESMAN.

rxoG

.BODY TYPE

jLt«L*^r fk

ir.i.n
CASH SELLING PRICE
ACCESSORIES OPTIONS

* y^flgi

YEAR

MAKE.

COLOR -

.ODOMETER

STOCK NO..

DEL
.DATE

•.

s-A-rl

USED TRADE-IN AND/CR OTHER CREDITS
MAKE OF TRADE-IN
MILES
YEAR
BODY TYPE
SERIES
V.I.N.
BALANCE OF $ .
.OWEDTOTO BE PAID BY:
O PURCHASER
D SELLER
ADDRESS
GOOD
VERIFIED
BY:
UNTIL:
DATE:
USED VEHICLE ALLOWANCE
BALANCE OWED ON VEHICLE
NET ALLOWANCE ON USED VEHICLE
DEPOSIT
CASH WITH ORDER

TOTAL CREDIT (Transfer to Left Column)
DOCUMENTS — Signed and Received
D Title (If not, explain:
D Registration
ZJ Odometer Statement
3 Bill of Sale

l
EHICLE WITH ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS
ERVICE CONTRACT

DCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE
JB TOTAL
HADE ALLOWANCE
OCABLE AMOUNT
TAH SALES TAX
DENSE & REGISTRATION
JOPERTYTAXDUE
TATE INSPECTION

TAL OF ABOVE ITEMS

^g&
fton
*-*»^£>

isIF-<L

t

r-frK-r

O Out-of-State Aff.
Z Power of Attorney
Z Auth. for Payoff

OTHER TERMS AGREED TO:

Purchaser agrees that this agreement includes all of the terms and conditions on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels
and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to
the subject matters covered hereby, and that THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
NOT BECOME BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY SELLER OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE. Purchaser by his execution of this agreement
acknowledges that he has read its terms and conditions and has received a
true copy of this agreement.

3-v^^y

CONDITIONS
: - .i s JiZTrfiL?* i.?;DI-K£TOGQ AUf^ M ^ T ^ A U Y AGREED:
*

•;.•: -'.r•••••*' «" '"** ^y^--i^^iCri'r.i;^y<\^^t\cr^j^

;r:«'c??cw:ng terms and condto^^

Tr?.. *;;;'- ;-*c?<;ro' ivss reserved the right to charge IheUst price of new motor vehicles vvithcjt nc??ce *r<s ir,<heev?r>*n3t r?e
>5?VV-J» ->r •»-«• r e * ¥eh;c!-3 piirch^^erj hereunder i* so changed, the cash delivered price, which ts based on list price effect: ve
..-• •* * v - ..-. of » f w?ry } w:ii gc^;-'-, ?n ir$u transsc**;;;* But if such cash d e l i v e r s price is Increased the buyer nay. if
•5 - W i . v / - s *'r;'- :ijch toe rebecs n<ic*. canes! ?n«& ores*. ?n which event ifaused vehicle h£* beer, traded in as 3 part of ms
r . / u i i - ' ^ ' ^ ^ e i n . v X h u*SttC2 v«stac*fc snail be ^ t j - n e a to the purchaser upon the payfT*em ol a r^sona&e charge rcr
r *>r^ - i %-«u iwOiiri {if a^.y > crs Jf tfc» *sc;3 v«*hic?s ha* h^en previously sold by the dealer, the amount received therefor, less 3
v:?:- "•: >v~.r?;3SK;-*i or ' ^ *rv« an/ s^psnso tocu^ec? in storing, insuring, conditioning or adver?is:nc* said vehicle tor saie.
cOrl .:r: f<?-^':ec io the p^rch-ss^r
"* v.-: ..••. • -' -^vr * :re? ? t:.; cf-:-;?>•*> * the -.I ^ i n ^ ; <vH ;?f s^-e *rid the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of
-*.•«:?. •ri-*-*,».:?e »~ *r*e $<•?•** cooclit*or* ana wrw^nincj ;r«e s&rne equipment as when appraised resionabis wear and ts^r
•-. rx^>:T -rd*K\-r^>^;:tt'vr3nts$j?;^^^
• '1 ; :.•».; \ . : . : •-; >- :'f * J ^ T •'•" ?hg ?..;.-•:..*• s^vr •;: complex S3sd rurchsseforany reason other thar* Conciliator* or account 01
•—: * r • :; n ;:??•» r*e ^ s - i 0*20*'. > «:;a> b^ renvneci as ;|q*iid<t!Od 3*mtige$. or in the event d ; » i ven.:cte has been taker ir
?:•:•:?••.. rrt*; -.**%• 'j.zzet h?:'^vy CLcth^riT^ ;i'.:2 ; ^" co *#;.' $£id used vehicle, snd the dealer sh«n b-s en-.-tfed tr> '^rr-bu^se h l m ^ ; :
•:»*:: or rhi; z-Xrt:(;> 0* ^u*;•: s^t*>f for the wpe.'v^c ^pe^ified <n p&rsgjaph 1 above and tAsc trs r»s f>>.pt-n&&s and !OSZB?
.-•>•: •::..: IT i^-fr.-ed 35 the r^-.?Us. o? pu?cr-•>•>£«'* b*i>u"fc: io cornriiete sa^d purchase.
*: :. • ' ^ , . . i - j { X f c : : -^". !/•?> ?:g?>rto r.^.-^,?:••;•/ c$^-:'i-^5 ;n ire rr.odel or dx:i?gn 0? any accsssc ' ^ i ?.n^ par? of any nev- rnoto
•*.e rfyi'hcu: c^>i?-;C i r > ct>::^^ :0:* w?- Uv:- p<irt or either th^ Ds^ie^ of ?h* M'snurscturer. to ni/iK*
:. >cirr cr\?7-.&}-i ir i-'-t; v^hNv^ c o v s x ^ fcy *r=;» aa'•ien^nt either bero?e or subsequ^?- *•:, :'*'•••$ dtlWvry of such v^hk:^
'•f

*,.:;.*

t

!>*••:•^»vsh^;ii^^l&fr-*i-»b?£: •o«\?fi5ysc3;;-K':dr>> ?•*«^ rri-^r-rjfcsCi-jre?; accidents; suret'es. fires, or ctr^r ;.^u56i D<3/onc !he cent "o

z

HAVE ^^^'-. M^DEBVEiTHERTHf
- v V.- ".''.v^,*-:* S A - ^ ^ ^ C r n O ' - P / ^ j ^ D A??. r-/^Dt: OR W I L L BE DZBAZD7Q
ZTr-LZ* f:r- - ' ^ MA^Uf'.v:-T\> t:-: 0-" T r t ^EV^ -MOTOR VEHICLE OR WOTOH VtH'CuS Ch^S§i3 FUR-%?3H£:
v*- -r ..4?-r-i?V. •-'C::::;'";.:'v.'i Q^ L ? T;•**;• ^ y j ^ ^ E ^ '•' •'••'•vf*'? EC; WARRANTY APrLfCABLE" T C SUCH /EHlGLr. OR v;EHICL:.
:-• v,: :•:••. -A^-:r- ^ A R ^ . ^ V V r< K S C O R K ^ A T E C HIRS-N AND MADE A PART HEREOF A$--JD A COPY C- WH^CH W^L ?.
r i . >£:..V£r:£r; TO -UROHAStH Ar ""HE TiMS OF DcUVcRY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR ivTOTOS VEHiCLS
C^^S!:-:^ ?-JCH vVAP.^ANTY S H A ; . L Be F.;sP«ESSLY i*N HSU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY. CXPRESS OR J M P U E D
. f . : - U D : M O . BUT KCT l i ^ * T E D TO. ANY ? f / K j £ 0 WARRANTY OF MERCHANT ABILITY OR FITSESS FOH A
• - r ^ 0 . i , A P FU^POSF. AND THE H - £ M E D ; E S SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE. THE ONLY REMEDIES
-'-.•• ; . ^ : . . r TO V-2Y PERKO^i ^Vi f H R£SPcCT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR V£H?CI.E CHASSIS
: O *vAr^AN'T ? i'5. i..i'-: <- V.:. C - ;.^PL ! ED. ARE VAD~ BY THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEH*CLE£
CR M01OR VENULE C.5v-^V-:r " j r , N : G ' - C ; ^ ^ t U N D E R EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED iN ^R*:TiNO BY 1HE
O-EALE?- FOR 's'j.-;r. USr.'O MOTOR v.:-W:OLfc OR MOTOR CHASSIS. WHICH WARRANTY. IF SO EXPRESSED ?N
^p?Tr4G- : s .rr: O ? I : O - A T ^ O n^pf IN ANO MADE A PART HEREOF.

T

;.- ^ ^ ^ c * v-yh'.c !•? c.c v«rt?d ^y tb-s asr^r.-jr.-: i;.; 5 u.sc-ii or denionstrator vehicle, no warranty or represont^tion is made *$ »o
irr* >i»u^i tu^h ^rn>clc ^^r. beon used, regardless or the mileage shown on the speedometer oi $*o used vehicle.

t?.

?n rr^ f^ve^t t^ar ?t bcc:orrfes oec.e.i/isry to? D-s&vr to enforce any of ibe terms and conditions of • his agreement, purchase
sg.'cr-t- tc *52y re5^or?abicr s^or^ey's fv>os awl courr co^-s

?. ^ * ^ a ^ x ^ s ^ t is Non-Transtor2fc!e
t!*

UABT^rTY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED iKT>!S AGREEMENT

•"

PURCHASER REPRESENTS that n*-she is IB vears of aqe or older.

• Tr

*»*

£•

T.re v iro vxtxete ts to remain vested in the Qv-iitr until purchase pr.ice is paid ?n fu«i; purchitswr o? a?>ts to dealer a s^ct-rit- • • v r - : : ;r» the subject vehicle to secure said payment in full.

f*' ^ j ^ e ^ t r n , verbal 0? ctnerw>?^5 ?;••• conlr?int:c] «n mis agreement will be recogn^ecl
- • - - »v.^ ^, r . : r L a ccvert-o by this o^rtfsme::: <s s i.itec! vehicle, the Information you see on we w=nco* fo» rn (Buyers G j«de:
-- - ••--'*-''f>rm overrides any conf'a , v;rc , -:^:;*' ; s<r:th^ canine t^^-t

y

'

O

t

I

y

X

*

Purcfcaw i Nam*

u

n

t

y

S

u

/

*

^

2

*

^

C

o

d

»

BusPttont

fosPhont

weby oider IrorK^ou and agree to purchase from you subject to ail terms, conditions and agreements contained herein, and the conditions printed on the
> side hereof the\jtlowing vehicle.
^
^ ^ "
A/ /
&
£ *
MAN.

CO

.BODY TYPE.

DNEW QttJSED
dttjSED DDEMO
DDi

X^l

YEAR/

.ODOMETER

-COLOR.
STOCK NO..

SELLING PRICE

SORIES/OPTIONS

* y^«.

.MAKE

.DATE

r^

w

/^

*"*f /

USED TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS
MAKE OF TRADE-IN
MILES
YEAR
BODY TYPE
SEfllES
V.I.N.
BALANCE OF $_
.OWED T O —
TO BE PAID BY:
DPURCHASER
DSELLER
ADDRESS
GOOD
VERIFIED
BY:
UNTIL:
DATE:
USED VEHICLE ALLOWANCE
BALANCE OWED ON VEHICLE
NET ALLOWANCE ON USED VEHICLE
DEPOSIT
CASH WITH ORDER

±

Ta?)rry>

TOTAL CREDIT (Transfer to Left Column)
DOCUMENTS — Signed and Received
D Title (If not, explain:
Q Registration
D Odometer Statement
Q Bill of Sale

^ j &
WITH ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS

,E CONTRACT
ENTARY SERVICE FEE
TAL
ALLOWANCE
: AMOUNT
iLESTAX
& REGISTRATION
TY TAX DUE
JSPECTION

OTHER TERMS AGREED TO:

T£ffff

=*u

F ABOVE ITEMS
EDITS rTt«mt»rfd tromrtghtcolumn)

D Outof-State Aff.
D Power of Attorney
Q Auth. tor Payoff

QJ9 &\

n/n )

Purchaser agrees that this agreement includes all of the terms and conditions on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels
and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to
the subject matters covered hereby, and that THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
NOT BECOME BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY SELLER OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE. Purchaser by his execution of this agreement
acknowledges that he has read its terms and conditions and has received a
true copy of this agreement.

"Ms//

J T - T0«lt
S-?/

^

.,.State Tax Commisi.o .
Motor Vehicle Division

[•$j; _
1095 Motor AvO.
*£•' Sa.iUKeO/.Ut.-.i &•;•••
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•>••«%.• v a t 1

• «55ICHM»T Of TITlt BY HtCISTtRtO OWHtB ' . |
• W D S A L E S / P U R C H A S E PHIGt
KmL
OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND OOOMETER DtSCLOSURE
for* the Sates/Purchase price specified horoln, I (we) tho undersigned ownorfs) /tereby t r a n s f e r r i n
eorwey and assign all rights, title, and interest to the vehicle described cjn the.face hereof 'to-fS w
I
——•I
-the New Owner namod below, and warrant the title to be free and dear Of ^all encomorances.V^^ N t t W r t o *
:<xeept a lien In favor of the porson identified below as New Uen-Holder, If any. 7 " *:;••>:'; \;r \;" .tf.lrWSjj
A VEHICLE.

"»

READING
•*?,"*'

By Owner / Authortt«d Afpnt .•
(Nan* cnutl b* prtfttod),.
, , . '".I'**':•*• •>• 4v

tr«rMl«ror / Company N«nw

;*5hose eurrsnl address Is: Street.

•milos (no terttnsj
>* tho best of my Kx.-. •

-rap;
' ^
_
st
' \ %?k>tir
•'• •
thereby certify that on the date of this statement, the odometer reads the mileage here

'

i * .. .• •

* Signature of Transferor in Ink (mutt to nottrifttd)

/«*->-.•-••

^6ighatur« of Joint Transferor (mutt o t notarized)

:"'• •.•:; - v V k ' - V * * 3 V * " N o t a r y , , ; -.W^S
^.l9_^!^;:V'Seai* • ^ $

-fSu&Scribed and sworn to this . « _ _ - _ day of.

'&*&.-

^

Signature of Notary Public or M.V. Examiner, . r / , 1 . ^
. . • ..;!:, [•';• NEWUSN-HOLPER (Namemust'be

j^NEW OWNER (Name must be printed)

3g.*MMe-

NAME

^ADDRESS.
^

r . •

ADDRESS;
CITY.
• DEN RELEASE;-;Sjonatumof Purchaser(NewOwner)•*-• - • : : — V . M ^ » . «->- . ^ " * . - ' • « ' "
.ST-

vlfei^-v

*

£w.5£,."

t

.ZIP-,

. . . ' . •

• • • - . . . , . v:—.'•• D J I > J.:.'.

Bt-AssiGKrr.m or nnf DY i.mKSFcnon

' '"-.'•'•• '"r V * * ^ . 1 ' -

:

:••• ^ v . ^ j f i u : ! :

J

1 aALES/PURCHAS;E

p;;;CE

-i-?*c%5r. * *
OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND OOOMETER DISCLOSURE
C L O S U R E ^ ^ ^-i>.v^:;;uv
1fei«ar*rte«.%' ;' s
jfcVihe Sales/Purchase price specified herein. I (we) the undersignedI *owner(s)
ownertsKhereby
transfer,;
•>
.^11
-convey and assign all rights, title, and interest to the vehicle described on the face hereof toHcfr;
tthe New Owner named below; and warrant the title to be free and clear of aQ encumbrances, ?c\l
P4 3/A«rv
n«lv«d
%xc4&, afeninfavorof the person identified below as New Lien : Holder. If s n y / ; f ^ f * K% f /\; •:/ ? ?v
:
^ S f t v / t S . § T A T E ^ L A W REQUIRE THAT THE OWNER jSjATE T H E ' ^ A 6 E UPO^ T R A ^ g R J ^ Q l ^ R S H R - O F A V t m ^ t
-fAILURETO COMPLETE A STATEMENT, OR PROVIDING A FALS^WEMENT. MAY' RESULT IN F'INES AND/()R IMPRISONMENT.

jEffi*"'

•

IV^-.TnifwIwor/ConipanyNarnt

•

.. ..
•*

. . . '."'*-%*:'!*•? >?.t&.

,.,••••

By Owner/ AuthorUM) A g e n t ' i : ;

« '.rQQtDMETER
v/.v.?.'^ A'j.a;

READING

rli

^ J - . . ( N « M muit b« printed) : .-•; " v ; : , , •»•: •;\>.\ f \* -.aNtme; must b e p n r S d ) ^ ^ . ^ •.-•••l?:t
wihcie curTsrt address is: • S m ^
': •
' •••' • ; v '"•• : r ' ^ - ' ^ ^ " ; ? " V > ^ ! |
<S^T:,'V
:
• • • • » • • ' '••*--•••"'•• 7 J p ^ : ^ ^ ' - - '
' V . ^ > , j ^ . m?les (no tentts)
haraty certiry that on the date of this statement, the odometer reads the mileage here recorded,''ar#™{lo the best of my xrv
B
a e
r r
u te one 1
?&$?£&l&$i^^
9 mileage in excess
9 JJl^y?^!.
P ^ mechanical
9 V* foliovving
checked: ^ ^ i v l i ^ V ^ w S 1 '
W^jReflects the $^\!*!?
amount of
of the odometer
limits/ is•••
mecnanicai limns/
- ::. • ; " ^ V W C ^ M J
r j ^ i j s NOT the actual mileage f a this vehicle. WARNING - ODOMETER
X)METER DISCREPANCY.
: :i:?.^v t f ® * *
K **5 *
_ '
•* *
l^ftatvf* of Transferor in ink (mutt oe noUriied)
Ugnttur* of Joint Tr«n$f«ror (mutt be notarized) •

kib^CYlbed and sworn to this "

day of.

^ J W OWNER (Namemust be pAmqf&j:.

•5^ NAMt

"ADDRESS.
•"TV

£»-v

T r r - r ^ .C: ^ r ^ ^ S e a T > y v ^ f ^ ; V

. ffcnatum of Nota^ h ^
NEW UEN-HOLDErt (Name must be!

CT • •

T I P •• ' • . • . . • • • • ^ • j t f i n B w ^ ^ ^

Signatunj ol Purchattr

»i

*cSt1i38EEr
•.•^.•. t a w w , .

„

H

LfXAM CODE AMN. | 4 1 - 1 - 6 2 REQUIRES THE OWNER TO REMOVE THE UCENSE PLATES UPON, THE «AL£JOR:DISPOSAL OF A VEHICLE
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 56 (a)-(g), U.R.C.P., provides?
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days
from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof•
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as
to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to that day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleading
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel,

shall if practicable ascertain what material

facts

exist

without substantial
controversy
and what material
facts
are
actually
and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon
make an order specifying
the facts that appear
without
substantial
controversy,
including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing
such further proceedings
in the action as are
just.
Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be
deemed established,
and the trial
shall be
conducted
accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits? further testimony; defense
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made
on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the
affiant
is competent to testify
to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred.to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
IJB3\146381.2

6/11/95-1

70

supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific
facts

showing

that

there

is a genuine

issue

for

trial.

If he

does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall
be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts
essential
to justify
his opposition,
the court may refuse

application for judgment or may order

a continuance

affidavits to be obtained or depositions

discovery

the

to permit

to be taken

or

to be had or may make such other order (aaplaas|asfedded)

Rule 4-501 (2), Code of Judicial Administration provides:
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement
of
material
exists.

facts as to which movant contents no genuine
issue
The facts shall be stated in separate
numbered

sentences

and shall specifically refer to those

the record

upon which the movant

portions

of

relies.

(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement
of
material
facts as to which the party contends a genuine
issue
exists.
Each disputed
fact shall be stated in
separate
numbered sentences
and shall specifically
refer to those

portions

of the record

upon which the opposing party relies,

and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or
sentences
of the movant's facts that are disputed.
All
material
facts set forth in the movant's statement
and
properly
supported by an accurate reference
to the
record

shall

unless

be deemed admitted
specifically

statement.

qB3\U6381.2

for the purpose of summary judgment

controverted

by the opposing party's

(emphasis added)
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STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0890
Ross R. Kinney, Wis. Bar No. 01009043
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.
Quarles & Brady
411 East Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53202
(414) 277-5731
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
TED SOMMER dba SOMMER'S AUTO
WRECKING,
Plaintiff,

v.
JACK W. SOMMER, WAYNE SOMMER,
and TRANSMISSION TECH, INC.,
Defendants.

]
]
1
I
I
i
i

MOTION FOR
FILING AND
AMENDMENTS
ADDITIONAL
CROSSCLAIM

ORDER AUTHORIZING
SERVICE OF
SETTING FORTH
COUNTERCLAIM AND

;

Case No. 930014410CV

]

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Defendant Transmission Tech, Inc., by its attorneys, hereby
moves the Court pursuant to Rule 15, U.R.C.P., to enter an Order
granting it permission to serve and file the attached First
Amendments Setting Forth Additional Counterclaim and Crossclaim
within seven days after the date of that Order.

The grounds for

this motion are that the additional Counterclaim and Crossclaim
simply requests additional relief from parties already involved
QB3\111390.i
•70

in this action vis

a vis

the sales transaction that has been

involved in this action from the beginning,
necessitate additional discovery or delay in any way the
forthcoming trial in this action.

Dated: November fjP# 1994.
Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Defendant

QB3\111390.1

STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.
Suite 302 Felt Building
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0890
Ross R. Kinney, Wis. Bar No. 01009043
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.
Quarles & Brady
411 East Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53202
(414) 277-5731
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
TED SOMMER dba SOMMER'S AUTO
WRECKING,
]
|
Plaintiff,
]|
I

FIRST AMENDMENTS SETTING
FORTH ADDITIONAL COUNTERCLAIM
AND CROSSCLAIM

J

•••

i
JACK W. SOMMER, WAYNE SOMMER, ]
and TRANSMISSION TECH, INC.,
Defendants.

Case No. 930014410CV

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

;

Defendant Transmission Tech# Inc., by its attorneys, hereby
allegess
1.

Incorporates herein by reference all of its allegations

contained in its initial Counterclaim and Crossclaim.
2.

During the sale of the Truck during March, 1991 there

vas a fraudulent conspiracy among defendant Wayne Sommers and two
employees-representatives of plaintiff Sommer's Auto Wrecking to
falsify and fraudulently create a Utah Dealer Registration
QB3\1U367.
Id

Hecord, utilizii

forged s jjrjmat un? dr LI i idl.se notary jurat,

-which would cause a false-fraudulent Utah Certificate of Title
being issued stating that "Jack W. SoramerM was M m pirrrli.v-Hi nf
and
Transmission Tech,

has been injured

its repair

business as a result of this

amages,he costs incurred by it

witli respect to the repair and storage of - "• - Truck, but tJ so i ts
attorneys fees and other

i

incurred

defending this litigation brought by Plaintiff t reliance
upon the aforesaid Utah Record and Utah Certificate.
WHEREFORE, Transmission Tech, Inc. respectfully requests
-that judgment be entered against plaint.il I S n

ecking

and defendanl "I Uv\ III<H ["Jomraer, jointly and severally:
>r recovery of a 1.1 1 hr compensatory damages wh i ch
it has incurs

J

result of

aforementioned fraudulent

'" Un> •

judgment as a

conspiracy, including, without limi

,

reimbursement for ill the reasonable attorneys
fees and litigation costs which it has incurred to
the date of judgment?
B.

f o i" i"„ ,i •» • i i,: o v e i, f o f punitive damages;

C.

for the recovery of its costs, disbursements,
expenses and attorney
a c t j,on ;,•' iiinnJ

XJii .i | J i i Jti #..

D.

v
*„* further relief as the Court may
for such other and further re
deem just.

Dated: November

, 19 94 Steven H. Lybbert
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.

Ross R. Kinney
Attorney for Defendant
Transmission Tech, Inc.

QB3\11»W.
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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE
Tl le undersigned certifies that on the following date he
personally arranged fo: r.he following number?
initial brief to

IT>I;

^f Appellant "",'»

c l„a,rts jio^t. .- • pre-paid, t,.o the

following persons and addresses:
8 copies to Appellate Court
Clerk of the Third Circuit Court
State of Utah
451 South 200 East

S a l t Lake C i t y , IJT

84111

2.

2 copies to Gayle Dean Hunt
Gayle Dean Hunt & Associates
#50 South, 600 East, Suite 250
Salt Lake, City, UT 84102

3.

1 copy to Steven Lybbert
Felt Building Suite 302
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake CI ty, UT 84118

4.

1 copy to Wayne Sommer
14600 Majestic Oaks Lane
Riverton, UT 84065

5.

2 copies to Steven A. Wuthrich, Esq.
815 East 8230 South
Sandy, UT 84094

Dated this

/^< of June, 1995.

k

Ross R. Kinney
One of the Attorneys for Appellant

QB3\149921.

